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Social dilemmas occur when individual incentives are misaligned with group interests1–8.
According to the tragedy of the commons these misalignments can lead to overexploitation
and collapse of public resources. The theory of direct reciprocity9–19 suggests that repeated
interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous work has assumed that the public
good remains constant in every round. Here we introduce the idea that the public resource
itself is changeable and depends on the outcome of previous interactions. A natural setting
is that cooperation increases the public resource from one round to the next, while defec-
tion decreases it. Thus, cooperation allows the possibility to play a more valuable game,
while defection leads to a less valuable game in the next round. The analysis of this idea
requires the theory of stochastic games20–23 and its introduction into evolutionary game
theory. Surprisingly, we find that the dependency of the public resource on previous inter-
actions can greatly enhance the propensity for cooperation. For these results, the interac-
tion of reciprocity and payoff feedback proves crucial: neither repeated interactions in a
constant environment, nor one-shot interactions in a changing environment can yield sim-
ilar cooperation rates. Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and
environment - either naturally occurring or designed - help to overcome social dilemmas.
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The tragedy of the commons leads to the question of how to manage and conserve public re-
sources1–8. Any solution to this problem requires an understanding of which processes drive hu-
man cooperation, and how institutions, norms, and other feedback mechanisms can be employed
to reinforce positive behaviors24. These questions are often explored by analyzing stylized social
dilemmas, like the public goods game25 or the collective-risk dilemma26, that provide valuable
insights into the dynamics of cooperation in controlled settings. When subjects interact in such
games over multiple rounds, it is typically assumed that the public good remains constant in
time, and that its value in every round is independent of the outcome of previous interactions9–19.
In particular, it is assumed that the same game, with the same payoff values, is played in each
round. Here, we explore the emergence of reciprocity when strategic choices in one round affect
the game payoffs in subsequent rounds. We introduce a quantitative framework that allows us to
capture that humans affect and in turn are affected by the value of the public resource, and that
they are able to anticipate and to adapt to such endogenous changes.
Our approach is based on the theory of stochastic games20,21. A group of players can find
itself in one of multiple states (see Fig. 1). The different states capture how the present physical or
social environment affects the players’ feasible actions and their payoffs. Stochastic game theory
has a rich literature with a wealth of deep results20–23. It has applications in computer science27,28
and in models of industrial organization, capital accumulation and resource extraction.21
We consider stochastic games where in each state, players interact in a social dilemma with
different payoff values. The players’ decision whether to cooperate or to defect does not only
affect the current payoffs the players receive, but also the game that will be played in the next
round. Fig. 1 illustrates a scenario reflecting the tragedy of the commons. Mutual cooperation
improves the quality of the public resource, leading the players to interact in game 1 with compa-
rably high payoffs. Partial defection, on the other hand, leads to a deterioration of the resource;
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players move to game 2 where feasible payoffs are lower. The stochastic game is played for many
rounds, and overall payoffs are defined as the players’ discounted payoffs per round. Transitions
between the different states (or games) can be stochastic or deterministic, state dependent or
state independent. The well-studied framework of repeated games is a special case of stochastic
games with only one state.
The impact of changing environments on evolutionary dynamics has previously been ex-
plored in one-shot, non-repeated games, not using the theory of stochastic games29–33 (see SI Sec-
tion 1.1 for a discussion of the respective literature). In some scenarios, the co-evolution of the
players’ strategies and their environment can lead to complex dynamics including oscillations
between cooperators and defectors31,32. But if cooperators are at a disadvantage in every possi-
ble environment, environmental feedback proves ineffective to prevent cooperators from going
extinct (Fig. S14). One-shot models assume that when players make strategic choices, they only
consider their present payoff. In stochastic games, players can take a long-term perspective in-
stead. To find an optimal strategy, they need to take into account how their actions affect the
subsequent response of their opponents, and the future state of the environment. As we show be-
low, this interplay of reciprocity and payoff feedback can be crucial for maintaining cooperation.
Traditionally, theoretical work on stochastic games considers players who are rational and
who can employ arbitrarily complex strategies, but it does not focus on the dynamics of how
players adapt their strategies. We introduce an evolutionary perspective to stochastic games.
Players do not need to act rationally, but instead they can experiment with their available strate-
gies and imitate others depending on their success34. We focus on simple strategies, which are
easy to implement and to interpret35,36. Such an evolutionary setup has proved useful to under-
stand the dynamics of cooperation in repeated games8–19.
We first study evolutionary dynamics of a stochastic game with two states (Fig. 2). We focus
on individuals using pure memory-one strategies, such that a player’s move depends only on the
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present state and on the outcome of the previous round (see Methods and SI for all details).
We compare the evolving cooperation rates in the stochastic game with the cooperation rates
in the two associated repeated games in which players always play the same game (Fig. 2).
We consider both, two-player interactions representing prisoner’s dilemmas, as well as n-player
interactions representing public goods games. In both cases, players can cooperate by paying
a cost c > 0. In the prisoner’s dilemma, this yields a benefit bi > c to the co-player, where the
benefit bi depends on the state i. In the public goods game, aggregated costs are multiplied by
some factor ri with 1 < ri < n (dependent on the state i), and redistributed among all group
members. Game 1 is more profitable than game 2 if b1 > b2 or r1 > r2. Players only find
themselves in game 1 if everyone has cooperated in the previous round. Our simulations show
that this feedback can boost cooperation dramatically. For reasonable parameter combinations,
we find that in the stochastic game populations quickly adapt towards full cooperation, although
neither of the two associated repeated games yields substantial cooperation levels.
In the stochastic game, cooperation evolves because defectors loose out twice: once, because
they risk to receive less cooperation from their reciprocal co-player in future, and second because
players collectively move towards a less beneficial game. The stochastic game is most effective in
boosting cooperation if the benefit in game 1 is intermediate (Fig. S2). If b1 is too low, the double
loss present in the stochastic game does not suffice to incentivize mutual cooperation, whereas
if b1 is comparably high, players cooperate in the first game anyway. For an evolutionary setup,
we show that stochastic games can lead to cooperation, even if all the individual repeated games
alone fail.
We derive a condition for the stability of cooperation in stochastic games with two states
and state-independent transitions. A numerical analysis for the two-player case suggests that
full cooperation emerges when Win-Stay Lose-Shift9 (WSLS) becomes stable (Fig. S6). This
strategy prescribes to cooperate in the next round if and only if both players used the same
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action in the previous round. In a conventional repeated prisoner’s dilemma, WSLS is a Nash
equilibrium if b ≥ 2c.8 In the stochastic game WSLS is an equilibrium if
(
2q2 − q0
)
b1 +
(
1− 2q2+q0
)
b2 ≥ 2c. (1)
The parameters qi refer to the conditional probability that the players will be in game 1 in the
next round, given that i of them have cooperated in the present round. If mutual cooperation
leads to game 1 and mutual defection to game 2, we have q2 = 1 and q0 = 0. Therefore WSLS
is stable if 2b1−b2 ≥ 2c. Because b1 > b2, this condition is easier to satisfy than the respective
conditions for the two associated repeated games.
Condition (1) highlights that the stability of cooperation depends on how the states change
with respect to the players’ decisions. To systematically explore the impact of this exogenous
feedback, we have repeated our simulations for all eight deterministic and state-independent two-
state games (Fig. S4, Fig. S6). In six of those stochastic games, players spend more time in the
profitable game 1. But only in two of the six stochastic games, players actually cooperate. In
line with condition (1), cooperation only evolves if q2 = 1 and q0 = 0, with q1 turning out to be
irrelevant. Stochastic games are most effective in promoting cooperation if mutual cooperation
improves the public good, while mutual defection deteriorates it, which is a very natural scenario.
Analogous conclusions hold for multi-player interactions with more than two states (see SI).
Probabilistic transitions can further enhance the evolution of cooperation. In Fig. 3a, we
consider a scenario in which mutual cooperation in game 2 leads back to game 1 with probability
q. We find that the optimal value of q is intermediate: players should have some chance to return
to the better state, but it should not be too easy. In Fig. 3b we explore whether individuals become
more cooperative if the length of the game is not exogenously given, but affected by the players’
decisions. Individuals start in state 1, in which they play a conventional prisoner’s dilemma; if
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one or both of the players defect, there is some probability q that players move towards state 2
in which no further profitable interactions are possible. This form of environmental feedback
promotes cooperation; payoffs become maximal for small but positive q. In Fig. 3c we consider
a model with timeout. Defection leads to a temporal state in which no profitable interactions
are possible. The return probability to the regular game is given by q. We derive adaptive
dynamics for simple reactive strategies (x, y), where x denotes the cooperation probability after
having been in state 1 previously, and y is the cooperation probability after having been in the
timeout state. In such a scenario, the fully cooperative strategy (1, 1) can become stable, although
unconditional cooperation is never stable in a conventional repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
Next we explore the ideal feedback between game payoff and strategic choice. We consider
a stochastic game with four players and five states. Defection by a subgroup of players has
an immediate, gradual, or delayed negative impact on the benefits of cooperation, or no effect
(Fig. 4). We obtain the highest cooperation rates for immediate negative impact. The intuitive
explanation is as follows: maximum cooperation arises if the players are most incentivized to
cooperate in the most valuable game. In the immediate scenario, any deviation from cooperation
in game 1 leads to a game with the lowest payoff. Interestingly, even the scenario with a delayed
response promotes higher cooperation rates than the stochastic game in which the public good
remains unchanged across all states. Amazingly, the lowest cooperation rates are obtained when
the benefits of cooperation are high in all five games. We obtain similar conclusions when we
consider a state-dependent game in which it may take several successive rounds with mutual
defection to end up in the worst possible state (Fig. S12, Fig. S13).
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated in-
teractions. The standard assumption has been that the same game, with the same payoffs is
played again and again. Here we introduce the concept that the game payoff changes in different
rounds. In particular, we explore cases where cooperation leads to a more valuable game next
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round, and defection to a less valuable one. Surprisingly, we find that this setting dramatically
boosts cooperation. In the resulting stochastic game, cooperation can prevail even if cooperation
is unsuccessful in all individual repeated games. Our observations suggest how naturally occur-
ring or designed feedback can promote cooperation. A tragedy of the commons can be avoided
if the environment deteriorates (rapidly) as a consequence of defection. Likewise, cooperation
is boosted if there is the prospect of playing for higher gains should the current cooperation suc-
ceed. The evolutionary analysis of stochastic games represents a new tool for understanding and
influencing human decision making in social dilemmas.
Methods Summary
Stochastic games. To fully describe a stochastic game, one needs to specify five objects: (i) the
set of players N , (ii) the set of possible states S, (iii) the set of actions A(si) that are available
to each player in a given state si, (iv) the transition function Q which describes how the current
state of the environment and the players’ actions in a given round determine the state in the next
round, and (v) a payoff function u, describing how the payoffs of the players in a given round
depend on the players’ actions and on the present state. The framework of stochastic games does
not specify how much time passes between consecutive rounds, nor does it restrict the payoffs
that are available in each round. The respective model parameters need to be chosen with respect
to the specific application at hand (see SI for a detailed description of the framework and how it
applies to specific examples). Herein we have considered scenarios in which players face a strict
social dilemma in each state, but the framework can easily be adapted to more general payoff
constellations (Fig. S8).
Throughout the main text, we have considered simple examples of stochastic games. Players
can choose between cooperation and defection, and thus their action set is {C,D} for each state.
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Transitions are symmetric: the transition function Q does not depend on which of the players
has cooperated or defected. The payoffs per round are symmetric and in the 2-player case given
by payoff matrices. The payoff of a player in the stochastic game is defined as the player’s dis-
counted payoff per round over infinitely many rounds. Initially, players are in state 1.
Memory-one strategies. In general, strategies for stochastic games can be arbitrarily complex.
A player’s action in a given round may depend on the present state and on the whole previous
history. To facilitate an evolutionary analysis, we focus on strategies in which players only take
into account the present state and the outcome of the previous round. For n-player games with
m states, such ‘memory-one strategies’ can be written as a 2nm-dimensional vector p = (pia,j).
Each entry pia,j is the player’s probability to cooperate in a given round, given that the present
state is si, and in the previous round the focal player chose action a ∈ {C,D}, while j of the
n−1 other group members have cooperated. When all players use memory-one strategies, the
dynamics of a stochastic game can be described by a Markov chain with m2n possible states
(s1, C, . . . , C), . . . , (sm, D, . . . , D). In this notation, the first entry refers to the state of the pub-
lic good in a given round, and the other n entries refer to the players’ actions. Using the theory
of Markov chains, we compute the players’ expected payoffs (see SI).
Evolutionary dynamics. To describe how individuals adopt new strategies over time, we con-
sider a standard imitation process34. There is a population of size N . Each member of the
population is equipped with a memory-one strategy which prescribes how the individual plays
the stochastic game. In each evolutionary time step, every player interacts with every other player
to derive a payoff from the stochastic game. Then two individuals are drawn randomly from the
population, a learner and a role model. The payoffs of those two individuals are piL and piR, re-
spectively. The learner adopts the role-model’s strategy with probability ρ = 1/
(
1+e−β(piR−piL)
)
.
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The parameter β ≥ 0 corresponds to intensity of selection. For β = 0, we have random drift. For
β > 0, imitation events are biased in favor of strategies that yield higher payoffs. In addition to
imitation events, we allow for random strategy exploration, which correspond to mutations: with
probability µ an individual adopts a randomly chosen memory-one strategy instead of imitating
a co-player. We analyze the ergodic mutation-selection process with computer simulations. We
obtain exact numerical results when exploration events are rare.
Specific methods used for individual figures. Except for the results in Fig. 3c, the main text
considers examples where players use pure memory-one strategies subject to small errors (such
that pia,j is either ε or 1 − ε, with ε = 0.001). This assumption allows us to derive numerically
exact results in the limit of rare mutations37. Further simulations using stochastic memory-one
strategies confirm that the respective results are robust (Fig. S2). For the evolutionary trajectories
of Fig. 2 we have averaged over 100 simulations with mutation rate µ = 0.002. Our numerical
results use population size N = 100, intermediate selection (β = 1) for pairwise games and
strong selection (β = 10) for multiplayer games. Except for the stochastic game in Fig. 3b, we
assume that future payoffs are not discounted, δ → 1. Our qualitative results are robust with
respect to parameter changes (Fig. S3). Fig. 3c shows the phase portrait of adaptive dynamics8
for the game with time-out; the differential equation is derived in the SI.
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Figure 1: In “stochastic games”, the players’ decisions in one round determine the game that will
be played next round. a, For example, if some players defect in a public goods game, the environment
could deteriorate and thereby reduce the value of the public good. If all cooperate, the environment could
recover and the original value of the public good might be restored. In this illustration, we show two
public goods games with r1 > r2. b, A stochastic game is deterministic if the players’ actions and the
current game uniquely determine the game that will be played next round, and there are no chance events.
It is state-independent, if the game in the next round only depends on the players’ actions but not on the
current game (state). Thus, we distinguish four different types of stochastic games, depending on whether
transitions are deterministic or probabilistic and whether they are state-independent or state-dependent.
We note that even a game that only involves deterministic transitions is referred to as a “stochastic game”,
because it represents a special case of the framework.
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Figure 2: Stochastic games can promote cooperation even if all individual games favor defection.
We study a, the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, which is a two-player game, and b, the repeated public
goods game (PGG), which here is interpreted as a four-player game. In both cases, the first game has a
higher benefit from cooperation than the second game. In the stochastic game, if all players cooperate the
next round will be the first game, but if some players defect the next round will be the second game. In
the standard, repeated games, the same game is used in every round. An analysis based on evolutionary
dynamics (see Methods) reveals that each of the standard repeated games fails to support cooperation,
while the stochastic game favors cooperation. Parameter values: a, b1=2, b2=1.2, c=1. b, r1=1.6, r2=
1.2, c=1.
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Figure 3: Probabilistic transitions maximize cooperation in three different stochastic games. a,
Game 1 is more profitable than game 2, but mutual cooperation in game 2 leads to game 1 only with
probability q. The evolving average payoffs are maximized for intermediate q. b, Game 1 is left with
probability q if at least one player has defected. The optimal value of q is small but positive for games
with a finite number of rounds (continuation probability δ = 0.999). c, Defection leads to a time-out
with an expected duration that depends on a return probability q. We derive the adaptive dynamics for
strategies that only take into account if players have been in game 1 in the previous round or in the time
out. Depending on the parameters, AllC is a stable endpoint of evolution: a population in which everyone
cooperates in game 1 cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy. Again the optimal value of q is
intermediate: low values of q increase the area of initial populations that move towards cooperation, but
they also make occasional errors more costly (parameters b1=3, c=1; q=1/2 is shown).
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Figure 4: Strong immediate feedback maximizes cooperation. a, A 4-player scenario in which coop-
eration improves and defection reduces the value of the public good. Transitions are state-independent:
the next state only depends on the number of cooperators but not on the previous state. In game 1, con-
tributions to a public good are multiplied by the highest factor r1 = 1.6. In game 5, cooperation does not
produce any social benefit, r5=c=1. For the payoff in the intermediate games 2, 3 and 4 we distinguish
three cases: partial defection has immediate, gradual, or delayed consequences on the multiplication factor
of the public good. In addition, we consider a fourth scenario in which the multiplication factor remains
high in all states. b, An evolutionary analysis confirms that immediately deteriorating public resources
are most favorable to cooperation, because they make unilateral exploitation a risky strategy. However,
all three stochastic games in which the benefits of cooperation vary lead to substantially more cooperation
than the game with no environmental feedback. Results of exact numerical calculations are shown. The
ranking is preserved if an alternative regime is considered in which it takes multiple rounds of mutual
defection to arrive at the worst state: immediate is better than gradual or delayed (Fig. S12).
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Section 1 gives a brief overview of previous work. Section 2 describes our approach and methods.
Section 3 presents further results for state-independent stochastic games with deterministic transitions.
We show how the success of cooperation depends on the transition structure of the stochastic game. We
give an analytical condition for cooperation to evolve based on the stability of Win-Stay Lose-Shift. We
demonstrate that our results are robust with respect to changes in evolutionary parameters. In Section 4,
we apply our framework to four different scenarios with probabilistic or state-dependent transitions. In
the appendices, we present some of the more technical aspects of our study. In Appendix A, we discuss
the feasibility of cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas. Appendix B provides the proofs of our
mathematical results. Appendix C gives our MATLAB algorithm for calculating payoffs in stochastic
games with two states and n players.
1 Previous work
We have studied the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in stochastic games. Several papers in evolu-
tionary game theory have explored the effects of changing payoffs. However, none of those papers use
stochastic games; there are no repeated interactions, and the players’ strategies do not allow for a targeted
reaction to the current game. On the other hand, there is a rich literature on stochastic games in general,
but previous studies do not consider evolution of strategies in stochastic games.
1.1 Previous work on evolutionary dynamics in games with variable payoffs
Traditionally, evolutionary game theory studies the dynamics of strategies if players interact in games
with fixed payoffs1–4. In recent years there has been a growing interest in exploring the dynamics of
strategies when the game’s payoffs are allowed to vary in time.
In the simplest case, these studies assume that changes in the game’s payoffs are exogenously driven,
and therefore independent of the composition of the population. For example, Assaf et. al.5 consider
social dilemmas where some parameters, such as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation, are subject to
1
extrinsic noise. Keeping the expected value of these model parameters constant, they find that noise
can increase the fixation probability of a rare cooperator. Ashcroft et. al.6 consider a model in which
the players’ environment randomly switches between different states. The states in turn affect which
2× 2 game is played. They show that such transitions between different states can facilitate the invasion
of a rare mutant. Gokhale and Hauert7 explore the impact of seasonal changes. In their model, the
multiplication factor of a public good game and a synergy factor change periodically in time. They find
that the survival of cooperation critically depends on the timescale at which these fluctuations occur. If
environmental changes are slow compared to the strategy dynamics, cooperation typically goes extinct
even if cooperators would be able to survive in an average environment.
Other studies have considered scenarios in which the players’ strategies co-evolve with their envi-
ronment. In these models, cooperators improve an environmental parameter, which in turn affects the
incentives to cooperate. Hauert et. al.8 have used such a setup to explore the coexistence of cooperators
and defectors in public good games. In their model, the total population size depends on the number of
cooperators. When the population is large, defection is more beneficial. As a consequence, the number
of cooperators as well as the total population size decreases. However, in smaller populations individu-
als interact in smaller groups, in which cooperators are at an advantage. Cooperation can re-invade. For
some parameter constellations, demographic feedback can thus lead to persistent oscillations, such that
both the fraction of cooperators as well as the population size fluctuate periodically9.
Weitz et. al.10 consider a more general framework for the coevolution of strategies and the environ-
ment. In their model, members of an infinite population interact in a 2 × 2 game. The game’s payoff
matrix A(n) depends on some environmental parameter n∈ [0, 1]. This environmental parameter in turn
depends on how many players cooperate. If defection is a dominated strategy in the payoff matrix A(0),
and if cooperation is dominated in A(1), populations may experience an “oscillating tragedy of the com-
mons”. In addition, Weitz et. al.10 describe all possible evolutionary scenarios depending on the payoffs
in A(0). Their classification shows that cooperation goes extinct if A(n) is a prisoner’s dilemma for all
n.
Another line of research has explored the evolution of cooperation when members of a community
share a renewable resource. The amount of resource available at any time depends on its intrinsic growth
function, and on the previous extractions by community members. The corresponding models show that
cooperation can be sustained if there is sufficient societal pressure for a responsible use of resources11,
or if groups of defectors are more likely to perish because of resource depletion12.
All of the above models consider one-shot games. While the players’ actions may affect the envi-
ronment, players do not take the long-term consequences of their actions into account. Instead, they
revise their strategies only based on the present payoffs. Players do not anticipate the future state of
the environment, nor are they able to engage in reciprocal interactions. As a consequence, these models
cannot explain which kind of environmental feedback helps to sustain cooperation in strict social dilem-
mas: if cooperators are at a disadvantage in each environmental state, cooperators also go extinct if the
environment co-evolves with the players’ strategies (see Appendix A for a detailed analysis).
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There has also been research on repeated games where players have access to continuous degrees
of cooperation13–19. Depending on the outcome of previous games, players can decide to increase their
contributions to a public good. In contrast to our approach, the game remains the same, irrespective of
the players’ actions. The players have continuous choices, but the game itself does not change.
Novelty of our approach
Our framework differs from previous evolutionary studies with variable game payoffs in the following
aspects:
1. None of the previous papers study repeated interactions.
2. None of the previous papers consider stochastic games.
3. In previous work, players do not tailor their response to the specific environment which they are
currently facing.
4. Previous work has suggested that under changing environments, cooperation can only evolve un-
der restrictive conditions; cooperation is not sustained if players face a social dilemma in each
environmental state6–10. In contrast, the framework of stochastic games shows that cooperation
can evolve even if it is disfavored in each state (Fig. 2).
5. Our framework is general and can be adapted to many new applications.
1.2 Previous work on stochastic games
Stochastic games have been introduced in the seminal work of Shapley20 for zero-sum discounted-sum
payoff. They were later extended to limit-average payoff21. The framework of stochastic games has
been applied in computer science to model reactive systems22–24, to analyze algorithms for poker25,26,
to industrial organization, accumulation of capital, and resource extraction27. The literature of stochastic
games has a wealth of deep mathematical results, such as determinacy results for discounted-sum pay-
off20, and the celebrated result for limit-average payoff28 that uses results on Puiseux series29 and results
of Shapley20. These classical results for stochastic games consider rational players with arbitrarily com-
plicated strategies. Such a general framework implies that many questions are open. For example, the
existence of Nash equilibrium in multi-player stochastic games is open for limit-average payoff. Re-
cent results30,31 establish existence of Nash equilibrium in the special case of two-player nonzero-sum
games, but the existence for three of more players remains open. The existence of equilibrium is known
for discounted-sum payoff32. While these results consider complex strategies and existence of equilib-
rium rather than the dynamics that can lead to equilibrium, we study evolutionary dynamics of stochastic
games with a simpler class of strategies.
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Novelty of our approach
1. We bring the framework of stochastic games to evolutionary biology. We make the framework
applicable to the broad context of human decision making in social dilemmas.
2. While the classical results for stochastic games take an equilibrium perspective, we introduce
evolutionary dynamics and study how strategic behavior evolves.
3. Previous work has considered rational players with arbitrarily complex strategies, for which even
existence of equilibrium is not always known. We study simpler classes of strategies (such as
reactive or memory-1 strategies), which make a computational analysis feasible.
4. While our analysis is motivated by problems in evolutionary biology, our new dynamic perspective
opens up a new research area, with many new exciting questions (e.g., on the dynamical stability of
equilibria). These questions are relevant to biologists, mathematicians, economists and computer
scientists.
We believe that the combination of evolutionary game theory with stochastic games provides an impor-
tant new impetus to the study of social interactions with dynamic incentives. Our framework allows us
to analyze how cooperation emerges when individuals affect their environment, and when they are able
to react to new environmental conditions and to their co-players’ past actions.
The framework of stochastic games opens up many new directions for evolutionary game theory.
Future work could explore stochastic games in structured populations33,34, where cooperation with one
player allows the possibility of forming new connections with other players. In such a scenario, the
entire network structure could co-evolve with the players’ actions35. Alternatively, defection (but not
cooperation) could allow the possibility of ostracism or punishment, such that much of the previous
work on the evolution of incentives36,37 may be recast in terms of stochastic games.
2 Model and Methods
In the following, we first give a full description of stochastic games. Then we formally introduce
memory-one strategies, and we show how the assumption of bounded memory can be used to calcu-
late payoffs explicitly. Finally, we also specify the details of the evolutionary process that we have used
to explore the dynamics of cooperation in stochastic games.
2.1 General setup of stochastic games
To define a stochastic game, we need to specify (i) the set of players; (ii) the set of possible states (iii)
the set of possible actions that each player can take in each possible state; (iv) a transition function that
describes how states change over time; (v) the payoff function, which describes how the players’ actions
and the current state affect the players’ payoffs. In the following, we introduce these objects formally.
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(i) The set of possible players. As the set of possible players, we take the setN = {1, . . . , n}. Through-
out this work we interpret this set as a group of individuals, interacting in various social dilemmas
subject to environmental feedback.
(ii) The set of possible states. We define S = {s1, . . . , sm} to be the finite set of possible states. Herein,
we interpret these states as the different environmental conditions that the players may face. The
players’ environment is considered to represent the sum of all exogenous factors that may affect
the group of individuals. In particular, the environment includes all ecological and social con-
straints the players are subjected to. The set of states may also include states that merely encode
the previous history of play (for example, by introducing a state that is reached if and only if all
players have cooperated in the last k rounds). We illustrate this possibility in Section 4.4, where
we model a game in which mutual defection has delayed consequences.
Without loss of generality, we will assume that as the stochastic game begins, players find them-
selves in state s1.
(iii) The set of possible actions. In each state, players independently need to choose which action they
would like to take. Herein, we only explore the case where the game being played in each state
is a social dilemma with two possible actions. Therefore, player j’s action set in any given state
takes the form Aj = {C,D} for all j ∈ N . We interpret these two actions as cooperation and
defection, respectively. The outcome of a given round of the stochastic game is then described by
an n-tuple a= (a1, . . . , an) where aj ∈ {C,D} is the action taken by player j. For example, the
n-tuple a= (C,C, . . . , C) denotes the outcome of a round in which all players cooperated. The
set A = A1 × . . .×An of all such n-tuples is called the set of action profiles.
(iv) The transition function. States can change from one round to the next. The state of the stochastic
game in the next round depends on the present state, on the players’ present actions, and on chance.
Formally, these changes of the states are described by a transition function Q : S × A → ∆S ,
where ∆S is the set of probability distributions over the set of states S,
∆S =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm
∣∣ xi ≥ 0 for all i, and x1 + . . .+ xm = 1} . (1)
That is, Q(s,a) = (x1, . . . , xm) gives the probability to be in each of the m states, given that the
previous state is s ∈ S, and the actions in the previous round are a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A. As an
example we can take the stochastic game depicted in Fig. 2a of the main text; for that example,
the transition function Q takes the form
Q
(
s1, (C,C)
)
= (1, 0), Q
(
s2, (C,C)
)
= (1, 0),
Q
(
s1, (C,D)
)
= (0, 1), Q
(
s2, (C,D)
)
= (0, 1),
Q
(
s1, (D,C)
)
= (0, 1), Q
(
s2, (D,C)
)
= (0, 1),
Q
(
s1, (D,D)
)
= (0, 1), Q
(
s2, (D,D)
)
= (0, 1).
(2)
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That is, if both players cooperated in the present round, the players will find themselves in State 1
in the next round with certainty; after all other outcomes, players will necessarily be in State 2.
In the above example, the entries of Q did only take the values 0 and 1; moreover, Q did only
depend on the players’ actions, but not on the present state of the environment. We call such
transition functions deterministic and state-independent, respectively. We note that even if all
transitions are deterministic, the game is still called a “stochastic game” because of two reasons.
First, games with deterministic transitions represent a special case of the general framework. Sec-
ond, even if transitions are deterministic, the next round’s state may still depend on chance events
if the players’ strategies do (i.e., if players use strategies that randomize between different actions).
If we want to refer to the j-th element in Q(s,a), i.e. the probability to move to state sj after
observing outcome (s,a), we will sometimes use the notation Q(sj |s,a). Herein, we only con-
sider symmetric transitions: the next state may depend on the number of cooperators in the present
round, but it does not depend on who of the players cooperated. Instead of writing Q(sj |s,a) we
can thus use the notation Q(sj |s, k), where k is the number of C’s in the n-tuple a. Moreover, for
state-independent transition functions Q, we will drop the dependence on the previous state s, and
write Q(sj |k) to denote the probability to move to state sj after k players have cooperated.
When there are only two possible states, we can also represent the transition function by a vector
q = (qik). Each entry q
i
k denotes the probability that the players find themselves in State 1 in the
next round, given that the previous state was si and that k of the players have cooperated. When the
stochastic game is state-independent, we drop the upper index i. As an example, using this notation
we can represent the transition functions of Fig. 2 as q = (qn, qn−1, . . . , q1, q0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0).
That is, players find themselves in state 1 if and only if all n group members have cooperated in
the previous round.
(v) The payoff function. The (stage game) payoff function u : S×A→ Rn describes how the players’
payoffs in a given round depend on the present state and on the players’ joint actions. Symmetric
games between two players can be represented by the respective payoff matrix,
U i =
(
uiCC u
i
CD
uiDC u
i
DD
)
. (3)
where uiaa˜ refers to a player’s payoff in state si, given that the focal player chooses the action a
and that the co-player chooses the action a˜. For symmetric games between n players, we use uia,j
to denote a player’s payoff in state si if the focal player chooses action a∈{C,D} and if j of the
other players cooperate. Importantly, we point out that herein we focus on stochastic games where
each stage game corresponds to a comparable social dilemma; allowing for arbitrary payoffs in
some of the stage games can give rise to somewhat trivial results (for example, if mutual defection
leads to a state in which payoffs are strongly negative irrespective of the players’ further actions).
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As an example for the payoff function in a stochastic game with more than two players, we have
considered a group of players that engages in a public good game in each state si. That is, each
player can decide whether she wants to contribute an amount c > 0 towards a common pool. Total
contributions are multiplied by a factor ri (which may depend on the state of the environment),
and equally shared among all participants. If j is the number of cooperating co-players in a given
round, the payoff of a player is
uia,j =

j + 1
n
ric− c if a = C
j
n
ric if a = D.
(4)
The prisoner’s dilemma that we have considered for 2-player interactions can be considered as a
special case of a public goods game with n= 2. In that case, the effective cost of cooperation is
c(1−ri/2), and the benefit of cooperation to the co-player is cri/2.
The framework of stochastic games assumes that players interact over infinitely many rounds, but future
payoffs may be discounted by a discount factor δ with 0 < δ < 1 (equivalently, one may interpret δ as
the continuation probability of having a further interaction after the present round). To define the players’
overall payoff for the stochastic game, let s(t) denote the state in which the players find themselves in
round t, and let a(t) denote the action profile played in that round. The payoff pi of the stochastic game
is the weighted sum
pi = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δt · u(s(t),a(t)). (5)
In the main text, we have often focused on the limit of no discounting, δ → 1, in which case payoffs are
given by the limit of the players’ average payoffs per round,
pi = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
u
(
s(t),a(t)
)
. (6)
In the examples used in the main text, the limit in (6) did always exist, due to our assumption that players
employ simple memory-one strategies with small errors1. If that limit exists, the two definitions (5) and
(6) coincide as δ→1.
Repeated games, which have been extensively studied in evolutionary game theory, can be considered
as a special case of a stochastic game with only one possible state, S = {s1}. Conversely, any stochastic
game between n players may be interpreted as an (asymmetric) repeated game with n + 1 players, in
which the additional player chooses the state of the next round according to the transition function Q.
Despite these connections, stochastic games can be very different from repeated games in terms of the
equilibria that are possible. For infinitely repeated games, the folk theorem applies: any feasible payoff
combination can be supported as an equilibrium, as long as all players yield more than their maxmin
payoff38. In particular, mutual cooperation can always be achieved in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
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Always 
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Figure S1: In stochastic games, an analogous result to the Folk theorem of repeated games does not need
to hold. For infinitely repeated games, the Folk theorem states that any feasible payoff combination that gives
each player more than her minmax payoff can be supported in an equilibrium. An analogous result does not need
to hold for stochastic games. a, As an example, we can consider a stochastic game in which the initial State 1
takes the form of a prisoner’s dilemma. Moreover, we assume that both players have a strong incentive to be the
first to defect (because the first unilateral defector has a lasting advantage in all subsequent rounds). Note that
in this game, transitions are not symmetric: the next state may depend on who of the two players defects. b, In
this stochastic game, mutual defection is the only outcome consistent with equilibrium considerations, although
mutual cooperation would make both players better off.
For stochastic games, it is well known that an analogous result does not need to hold; Fig. S1 provides a
simple counter-example in the context of social dilemmas. This counter-example is based on a game with
absorbing states; once such states are reached, they cannot be left any more. If the stochastic game is
instead “communicating” (such that one can get from any state to any other state with positive probability
by playing an appropriate strategy), then a Folk theorem result is feasible, see for example Ref. 39.
In the main text we have highlighted another difference between stochastic games and repeated
games: even if a stochastic game and the corresponding repeated games all allow for stable mutual
cooperation, the likelihood of reaching a cooperative equilibrium through evolutionary processes can be
vastly different.
To conclude this section, let us comment on a few questions that arise when stochastic games are
applied to specific examples. First, we note that the framework of stochastic games does not specify
how much time passes between two consecutive rounds. In some applications, such as in Hardin’s
example of farmers sharing a joint pasture40, this timespan might be best thought of as a year. In other
applications, like when teams in companies are assigned better tasks the more productive they have been
in the past, this time depends on the length of the specific task. In applications, one may thus wish to
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reflect the amount of time that passes between rounds by choosing an appropriate discount factor δ on
future payoffs.
Second, in some applications players may change their actions at a faster rate than the game payoffs
change. For example, when all players of a group defect, the corresponding changes in the players’
environment may not happen immediately, but only with one round delay. Similarly, it may take several
consecutive rounds of mutual defection for the environment to deteriorate. Such scenarios can be studied
when further states are added to the stochastic game’s state space, which keep track of how many con-
secutive rounds of mutual defection have occurred in the past. We illustrate this approach with a simple
example in Section 4.4.
Finally, the framework of stochastic games does not make any restrictions on the payoffs the players
face in any given state of the environment. To apply the framework to a specific example, one only needs
to formulate which payoff consequences the players’ actions have. In some applications, the players’
actions may have drastic consequences on the next round’s payoffs, whereas in other applications the
payoff feedback may be more gradual. We illustrate different ways to introduce payoff feedback in
Section 4.4.
2.2 Calculation of payoffs when players use memory-one strategies
Strategies for stochastic games can be arbitrarily complex; in general they take the whole previous his-
tory of the players’ actions and of the previously visited states as an input, and they return a value in
the interval [0,1] as an output (the player’s cooperation probability in the next round). To make an evo-
lutionary analysis feasible, we will focus here on the subset of memory-one strategies. A player with
such a strategy bases her decision only on the current state, and on the actions played in the previous
round. Formally, a memory-one strategy is a map P : S × A˜ → [0, 1], where A˜ = A ∪ {∅}. The value
of P (s,a) corresponds to the players’ probability to cooperate in the next round, given that the present
state is s∈S and that the players’ actions in the previous round are represented by a∈A (the empty set is
included in A˜ to encode the players’ move in the very first round in which no previous history of actions
is available). In Table S1, we present a few simple examples of memory-one strategies for stochastic
games between n players. In particular, this table includes the strategies AllD, proportional Tit-for-Tat
(pTFT ), and Win-stay Lose-shift (WSLS).
Restricting our attention to memory-one players is useful for two reasons. First, memory-one strate-
gies are comparably simple to interpret, which facilitates an intuitive understanding of the resulting
evolutionary dynamics. At the same time, memory-one strategies are sufficiently general to cover a wide
array of interesting behaviors that have been shown to be important in the context of cooperation in re-
peated games, see for example Refs. 18,41–51, and Chapter 3 in Ref. 1. Second, if all players make use
of a memory-one strategy, payoffs according to Eqs. (5) and (6) can be calculated explicitly. In that case,
the dynamics of play in the stochastic game can be described as a Markov chain, as we describe below.
The states of the Markov chain are all possible combinations (s,a) of environmental states s∈S and
action profiles a ∈A, which fully describe the outcome of a given round. In particular, if there are m
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Name Definition Description
AllD P (s,a) = 0
for all s and a
Strategy that defects in every round, independently of
the present state and of the actions of the co-players.
AllC P (s,a) = 1
for all s and a
Strategy that always prescribes to cooperate.
Grim
In the first round P (s1, ∅) = 1, then
P (s,a) = 1 if and only if a=(C, . . . , C),
otherwise P (s,a) = 0.
Trigger strategy that prescribes to cooperate as long
as everybody has cooperated in the previous round.
pTFT
In the first round P (s1, ∅) = 1, then
P (s,a) = k/(n−1) with k being the
number of cooperating co-players
Conditionally cooperative strategy; in a game with
only two players, pTFT simplifies to the classical
Tit-for-Tat strategy41.
WSLS
In the first round P (s1, ∅)=1, then
P (s,a)=1 if all players used the same action
in previous round, otherwise P (s,a)=0
Generalization of the corresponding strategy that has
proven to be successful in the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma42.
Only1 P (s,a)=1 for all a if s=s1,
P (s,a)=0 otherwise
Simple example of a state-dependent strategy – coop-
erates if and only if players find themselves in the first
state.
Table S1: Some examples of memory-one strategies for stochastic games.
environmental states and n players who can choose between cooperation and defection, then that Markov
chain has m · 2n possible states. To construct the transition matrix of the Markov chain, let us assume
that the transition function between states is given by Q, and that the players’ memory-one strategies are
given by P1, . . . , Pn. Then the probability that players move from (si,a) in one round to (sj ,a′) in the
next has the form
M(si,a)→(sj ,a′) = Q(sj |si,a) ·
n∏
k=1
yk, (7)
where the yk are defined as
yk =
{
Pk(sj ,a) if a′k = C
1− Pk(sj ,a) if a′k = D.
(8)
That is, the transition probability is a product of n+1 factors; the first factor represents the transition
towards the next environmental state, whereas the other n factors represent the transitions in the players’
behaviors. Similarly, the probability to be in one of the m · 2n states in the very first round is given by
v0(s,a) =
{ ∏n
k=1 zk if s = s1
0 else,
(9)
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where
zk =
{
Pk(s, ∅) if ak = C
1− Pk(s, ∅) if ak = D.
(10)
To calculate the players’ payoffs, let v0 be the row-vector that contains all the initial probabilities ac-
cording to (9) and let M be the corresponding transition matrix with entries as defined in (7). When
future payoffs are discounted, we compute the vector
v = (1− δ)v0
∞∑
t=0
(δM)t = (1− δ)v0(I − δM)−1. (11)
The entries v(s,a) of this vector can be interpreted as the expected frequencies to observe the outcomes
(s,a) over the course of the stochastic game. The players’ payoffs according to Eq. (5) can then be
computed by
pi =
∑
s∈S,a∈A
v(s,a) · u(s,a). (12)
In the limit of no discounting on future payoffs, δ → 1, the vector v according to Eq. (11) approaches a
left eigenvector of the matrix M with respect to the eigenvalue 1. In the main text, we have assumed that
the players use pure memory-one strategies subject to small errors, such that the probability to cooperate
is either ε or 1 − ε. Under this assumption, the limiting distribution v for δ → 1 is unique, and it is
independent of the players’ cooperation probabilities in the very first round.
In the following, due to the assumed symmetries of the stochastic game, we will often restrict our-
selves to symmetric memory-one strategies. If a player applies a symmetric memory-one strategy, her
action only depends on the present state, on her own previous action, and on the number of coopera-
tors among the co-players (but not on the identity of the cooperating co-players). Symmetric memory-1
strategies can be written as a vector p = (p0; pia,j). The entry p0 is the player’s cooperation probability
in the very first round. The entries pia,j represent the player’s cooperation probability in all subsequent
rounds, given that the present state is si and that the player has chosen action a∈{C,D} in the previous
round, while j other players have cooperated. If there are m states and n players, the space of symmetric
memory-1 strategies is (2mn+1)–dimensional; in the limiting case of δ → 1 we can ignore the entry p0
and the space becomes 2mn–dimensional.
2.3 Evolutionary dynamics
Herein, we do not presume that players act rationally from the outset. Rather we consider a population of
players, and we assume that individuals learn to adopt more profitable strategies over time. To model this
process of strategy adaptation, we use a simple pairwise imitation process2,52. As is typical in models
of direct reciprocity, we thereby assume a separation of timescales: players change their strategies at a
slower rate than they make their decisions in the stochastic game. Equivalently, we may also assume that
strategy updating occurs at a similar timescale, but when computing their own payoff, players take into
account how well their strategies would perform over the entire course of the game.
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Specifically, we consider a population of constant size N . Each individual is equipped with a sym-
metric memory-one strategy that tells the individual how to play the stochastic game under consider-
ation. The strategies of the individuals can change over time, due to imitation events and exploration
events (these two events correspond to selection and mutation in biological models). We assume that
in each evolutionary time step, individuals randomly form groups to interact in the stochastic game (in
other words, we assume that the population is well-mixed). Payoffs within each group can be calculated
using Eq. (12). Depending on the players’ own strategy, and on the strategy distribution in the remaining
population, we can thus compute expected payoffs p¯i for all players. To incorporate imitation events, we
assume that after payoffs have been computed, two individuals are randomly drawn from the population,
a learner and a role model. The learner compares her own payoff p¯iL with the payoff of the role model
p¯iR, and she decides to adopt the role model’s strategy with probability53
ρ =
1
1 + e−β(p¯iR−p¯iL)
. (13)
The parameter β≥0 is called the strength of selection. In the limiting case β=0, the imitation probability
simplifies to ρ = 1/2, independently of the players’ payoffs. In that case, players imitate each other
essentially at random. As β increases, imitation decisions are increasingly biased towards strategies that
lead to higher payoffs; in the limiting case β→∞, the role model’s strategy has only a positive chance
of being adopted if p¯iR≥ p¯iL.
To incorporate random strategy exploration, we assume that in each evolutionary time step there is a
probability µ > 0 that the learner decides not to look for a role model; instead, she simply picks a new
strategy from the set of all possible strategies (all memory-one strategies have the same probability to be
picked). These two elementary updating events, imitation and exploration, are then iterated over many
evolutionary time steps. This generates a stochastic process on the space of all population compositions.
Due to our assumptions on the updating events, this process is ergodic. In particular, we can use evolu-
tionary simulations over many time periods to estimate how often the members of the population choose
cooperative strategies in the selection-mutation equilibrium (Fig. 2 of the main text shows sample runs
that illustrate the resulting cooperation dynamics).
When the considered strategy set is finite, and when mutations are sufficiently rare, the abundance
of each strategy in the selection-mutation equilibrium can be computed exactly54,55. The assumption
of rare mutations implies that most of the time, populations are homogeneous. Only occasionally a
new mutant strategy arises, and this mutant strategy either fixes or goes extinct before there is a new
mutation. As a consequence, the evolutionary process can be described as a Markov chain, where the
states correspond to all possible homogeneous populations. By calculating the invariant distribution of
this Markov chain, we can compute how often each strategy is played in the long run, as described by
Fudenberg and Imhof.54.
If there are infinitely many strategies (for example, when considering all stochastic memory-one
strategies), the above method is not directly applicable any longer. Nevertheless, the assumption of rare
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mutations can still be useful to simulate the evolutionary process more efficiently, using the approach
of Imhof and Nowak56. If mutations are sufficiently rare, we can assume that at any point in time
there are at most two different strategies present in the population, the resident strategy and a mutant
strategy. For such a competition between two strategies only, analytical expressions for a strategy’s
fixation probability are available57–59. Hence, we can explicitly calculate the probability that a randomly
chosen mutant strategy fixes (in which case the mutant strategy becomes the new resident strategy), or
that it goes extinct (in which case the resident strategy remains). Overall, simulating this process leads
to a sequence of subsequent resident strategies. Based on this sequence, we can calculate the average
cooperation rate and the average payoff of the population over time.
3 Stochastic games with state-independent and deterministic transitions
3.1 A useful result to reduce the dimension of the strategy space
In the following section, we will discuss a few results that apply to the case when the players’ actions
uniquely determine the next state of the stochastic game. To this end, let us recall some definitions. We
say a stochastic game is deterministic if transitions are independent of chance,
Q(sj |s,a)∈{0, 1} for all states sj , s and action profiles a. (14)
The stochastic game is state-independent if the next state only depends on the players’ previous actions,
but not on the previous state,
Q(sj |s,a)=Q(sj |s′,a) for all states sj , s, s′ and all action profiles a. (15)
Finally, we call a memory-1 strategy P state-independent if
P (si,a) = P (sj ,a) for all states si, sj and all action profiles a. (16)
There is the following relationship between state-independent memory-1 strategies and stochastic games
with state-independent and deterministic transitions.
Proposition 1. Consider a stochastic game between players with memory-one strategies P1, . . . , Pn.
1. Suppose that for a given action profile a we have Q(sj |s,a) = 0 for all states s ∈ S (i.e., if the
players have chosen action profile a, it is impossible to reach state sj in the next round). Then the
transition matrixM , and hence the players’ payoffs, are independent of the values of Pk(sj ,a) for
all players k.
2. In particular, if the stochastic game has state-independent and deterministic transitions, then for
any memory-1 strategy Pi there is an associated state-independent memory-1 strategy P ′i such that
the payoffs of all players are unchanged if Pi is replaced by P ′i .
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All proofs are provided in the appendix of this SI. For state-independent and deterministic games,
Proposition 1 is useful for two reasons. First, Proposition 1 allows us to reduce the dimension of the
strategy space: without loss of generality we can restrict our attention to players with state-independent
memory-1 strategies. In case of symmetric memory-1 strategies p = (pia,j), we can thus drop the
dependence on the previous state si, and write p = (pa,j). If m is the number of states and n the
number of group members, the new strategy space is only 2n-dimensional (instead of 2mn-dimensional).
Second, Proposition 1 allows us to better compare a stochastic game with an associated repeated game
in which players always remain in the same state si. In each case, the relevant set of symmetric memory-
one strategies has the same dimension 2n. Thus if cooperation evolves for the stochastic game (but not
in the repeated games), this difference cannot be attributed to differences in the complexity of the two
strategy sets.
3.2 Comparing the evolutionary dynamics of stochastic games and repeated games
In Fig. 2 of the main text, we have considered the evolutionary dynamics of a state-independent stochas-
tic game with two states for either 2 players (Fig. 2c) or n players (Fig. 2b) . The transition function
for this stochastic game can be represented by the vector q = (qn, qn−1, . . . , q0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0). We
have compared this game with the two associated repeated games in which players always remain in
the same state. Using our framework, these repeated games can be represented by the transition func-
tions q = (1, 1, . . . , 1) (players always remain in state 1, independent of the number of cooperators)
and q = (0, 0, . . . , 0) (players never visit state 1). Due to Proposition 1, we have used symmetric and
state-independent memory-1 strategies, p = (pC,n−1, . . . , pC,0; pD,n−1, . . . , pD,0). Fig. 2 shows simu-
lation results of the process described in Section 2.3, assuming that players only apply pure strategies
with errors, such that each entry pa,j is either ε or 1− ε. This assumption leads to a finite strategy space
of size 22n. For finite strategy spaces we can use the method of Fudenberg and Imhof54 to calculate
exact strategy frequencies in the limit of rare mutations. Fig. S2a shows the corresponding cooperation
frequencies in the selection-mutation equilibrium for n=2 as a function of the benefit parameter b1. The
stochastic game always yields higher cooperation rates than the two repeated games, but the difference
is most pronounced for intermediate benefits to cooperation in State 1. If b1 is too small, cooperation
evolves in none of the scenarios; if b1 is sufficiently large, cooperation can already be achieved through
repeated interactions in State 1 alone.
To show that our results are robust when players have access to stochastic memory-one strategies, we
have run additional simulations using the method of Imhof and Nowak56. The corresponding simulation
results shown in Fig. S2b are qualitatively similar to our results for pure memory-one strategies. Again,
cooperation rates increase as the benefit b1 of cooperation in State 1 increases, but for the stochastic
game smaller values of b1 are necessary to sustain substantial cooperation.
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Figure S2: The stochastic game is most favorable to cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio in game 1 is
intermediate. a, For the 2-player game depicted in Fig. 2, we have used the method of Fudenberg and Imhof54
to calculate exact cooperation frequencies for various values of b1 when players are restricted to pure memory-
one strategies with rare errors. The advantage of the stochastic game is most pronounced when this benefit is
intermediate, 1.5 ≤ b1 ≤ 2.5. b, To explore whether stochastic strategies allow for different outcomes, we have
run simulations according to the protocol of Imhof and Nowak56. The two sets of results are in good qualitative
agreement. However, stochastic memory-one strategies lead to somewhat smoother transitions between almost full
defection and almost full cooperation as the parameter b1 increases along the x-axis. All parameters are the same
as in Fig. 2a of the main text: N=100, b2=1.2, c=1, β=1, ε=0.001, in the limit of no discounting δ → 1.
3.3 Robustness with respect to changes in evolutionary parameters
For the results shown so far, we have kept several model parameters at a fixed value. In the following, we
aim to demonstrate that our results are robust with respect to changes in these parameters. To this end,
we have re-calculated the evolving cooperation rates for the example discussed in Fig. 2a and Fig. S2,
and independently varied the following four parameters:
1. The error rate ε, which determines how often players misimplement their intended move (in the
examples shown in the main text, we have used ε=0.001).
2. The discount rate δ, which measures how relevant future rounds are for calculating a player’s
overall payoff (in the main text we have considered the limiting case of no discounting, δ→1).
3. The strength of selection parameter β, which determines how strongly players take a strategy’s
payoff into account when updating their strategies (in the main text we have used an intermediate
value β=1).
4. The mutation rate µ, which gives the rate at which players randomly explore new strategies (to
obtain exact numerical results, the data plotted in Fig. S2 has been derived for the limit of rare
mutations, µ→0).
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Figure S3: The presented findings are robust with respect to various parameter changes. To test the robust-
ness of our findings, we consider the stochastic game introduced in Fig. 2a of the main text, and we independently
vary four different parameters, (a) the error rate ε, (b) the discount factor δ, (c) the strength of selection β, and
(d) the mutation rate µ. Solid lines indicate exact results using the method of Fudenberg and Imhof54 in the limit
of rare mutations, whereas square symbols are used to represent simulation results. The dotted line in each panel
indicates the respective parameter value that we have used in Fig. S2a. In all four panels, the stochastic game leads
to more cooperation than each of the repeated games in isolation, independent of the exact value of the parameter
under consideration. All unspecified parameters are the same as in Fig. S2a.
Results for the error rate ε are shown in Fig. S3a, suggesting there are three parameter regimes. For
large error rates ε→ 1, cooperation decisions occur essentially at random, and the overall cooperation
rate approaches 50%, independent of the specific game being played. For smaller error rates, 0.1≤ε≤1,
mistakes occur too often to allow a targeted punishment of AllD players, and hence defectors prevail in
the stochastic game and in the two associated repeated games. Once ε ≤ 0.1, we recover the results from
the main text, showing that stochastic games can generate cooperation although the associated repeated
games cannot.
The effect of the discount factor on evolving cooperation rates is depicted in Fig. S3b. Also here,
we can identify three parameter regions. When δ is small, cooperation cannot be sustained at all because
there is a too high discount on future payoffs to incentivize cooperation in the present round. When
δ is intermediate (0.9 ≤ δ ≤ 0.99), substantial cooperation can be achieved in all three games. In this
parameter region, we observe that the most abundant strategy is Grim, which can sustain cooperation
as long as the expected number of rounds 1/(1−δ) is small compared to the time 1/ε at which one of
the players can be expected to defect by mistake. If δ is beyond that threshold, cooperation can only be
sustained in the stochastic game for the given parameter values.
The effects of the selection parameter β and the mutation rate µ are similar (Fig. S3c,d). When
β is small or when µ is comparably large, the evolutionary process is mainly governed by noise, such
that the evolving cooperation rates approach 50%. As β increases and µ decreases, a strategy’s per-
formance becomes increasingly important for the strategy’s survival, eventually favoring cooperation in
the stochastic game and defection in the two repeated games. Overall, Fig. S3 suggests that the results
presented in the main text are reasonably robust. When the transition structure of the stochastic game
itself incentivizes cooperation, then the stochastic game leads to higher evolving cooperation rates than
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Figure S4: Whether cooperation evolves in 2-player games critically depends on the form of the environ-
mental feedback. Keeping the payoffs fixed at the values used in Fig. 2a, we have explored how the evolution
of cooperation depends on the underlying transition structure of the stochastic game. a – h, We have calculated
the selection-mutation equilibrium for all possible stochastic games with two states when transitions are state-
independent and deterministic. i, Overall, 6 of the 8 transition structures lead players to spend more time in the
more profitable State 1, in which mutual cooperation has a higher benefit (as b1 > b2). j, However, only in
two out of these six transition structures cooperation evolves. These two structures have in common that mu-
tual cooperation always leads to the beneficial State 1, whereas mutual defection leads to the detrimental State 2.
Thus cooperation is most likely to evolve if the environmental feedback itself incentivizes mutual cooperation and
disincentivizes mutual defection. The transitions after unilateral defection play a less prominent role.
the associated repeated games, irrespective of the exact value of the other parameters.
3.4 Effect of transition structure on the evolution of cooperation
In the previous figures, we have compared evolving cooperation rates for three different transition struc-
tures, q = (1, 0, 0) (the “stochastic game”), q = (1, 1, 1) (“Only game 1”) and q = (0, 0, 0) (“Only
game 2”). To explore the role of transitions more systematically, we have calculated the cooperation
rate in the mutation-selection equilibrium for all 23 = 8 games with state-independent and deterministic
transitions q = (q2, q1, q0), with qi ∈{0, 1}. The results are shown in Fig. S4. We find that in 6 out of
the 8 cases, players succeed in predominantly being in the first state, in which cooperation is more ben-
eficial as b1>b2 (Fig. S4i). However, only in two out of these cases, players actually achieve substantial
cooperation rates (Fig. S4j). These two stochastic games, depicted in Fig. S4b,c, have in common that
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Figure S5: Impact of transitions on cooperation in 4-player public goods games. Here we explore the role
of different transition structures on the evolution of cooperation for a stochastic game with two states (with a
PGG being played in each state). State 1 is again more beneficial since r1 > r2, but to be in State 1 it takes
a minimum number k of cooperators in the previous round. a – f, For a four-player PGG, there are 6 possible
monotonic configurations of the stochastic game, as k can be any number between 0 (players always move to first
state) and 5 (players never move to first state). h, There is a non-monotonic relationship between the 6 transition
structures and the time spent in the more beneficial State 1. g, The evolving cooperation rate becomes maximal
when any deviation from mutual cooperation leads players to State 2 (case e). Parameters are as in Fig. 2b, with the
multiplication factor in the first state being fixed to r1 =2; to derive exact results, we have applied the framework
of Fudenberg and Imhof54, considering the limit of rare mutations µ→ 0.
mutual cooperation leads to the beneficial State 1, whereas mutual defection leads to the inferior State 2
(that is, q2 =1 and q0 =0). When these two conditions are satisfied, cooperation can evolve independent
of the transition after unilateral cooperation (that is, independent of q1).
Similarly, we have also explored how the evolving cooperation rates depend on the exact shape of the
evolutionary feedback when a group of n > 2 players is engaged in a public good game. In Fig. S5, we
consider all “monotonic” transition functions, for which players find themselves in the more beneficial
State 1 if at least k of the players have cooperated in the previous round, with k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 1}.
Formally, these are exactly the state-independent and deterministic transition functions q = (qn, . . . q0)
for which i < j implies qi ≤ qj . As expected, cooperation is most prevalent when the stochastic game
exhibits the most strict response to single players defecting. Evolving cooperation rates are highest if
already one defector is sufficient to let the group move towards the less beneficial State 2 (Fig. S5f).
Interestingly, all stochastic games in which players can find themselves in both states (Fig. S5b–e) lead
to higher cooperation rates than the two repeated games in which players always remain in the same state
(Fig. S5a,f).
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3.5 Numerical analysis of the evolving strategies
So far we have seen that for natural transition structures, stochastic games can favor the evolution of
cooperation. In this section, we aim to understand this process on the level of the evolving strategies.
To this end, we have again considered all eight state-independent and deterministic stochastic games
between two players. For these games, we have recorded how often the 16 memory-one strategies
p= (pC,1, pC,0, pD,1, pD,0) with pa,j ∈ {ε, 1−ε} are played in the selection-mutation equilibrium. We
let the benefit of cooperation in the first state vary between 1≤ b1≤3. To be able to make comparisons
across strategy sets of different size, we have normalized these frequencies. To this end, let λβ(p) be
the frequency of strategy p in the selection-mutation equilibrium when the strength of selection is β.
We define the strategy’s relative abundance by λβ(p)/λ0(p), where λ0(p) is the abundance of p under
neutral selection. We call a strategy favored by selection if λβ(p)/λ0(p) > 1, i.e., if the strategy is more
abundant than expected under neutrality.60,61
Fig. S6 shows the relative abundance for the two most important strategies AllD and WSLS across
the eight different stochastic games (together with the strategy Grim, which plays similar to AllD in an
infinitely repeated game with errors, these three strategies are typically played for more than 80% of the
evolutionary time). We note that only in four out of the eight stochastic games in Fig. S6, almost full
cooperation can be achieved as the benefit of cooperation in State 1 approaches b1 = 3 (this observation
remains true if the value of b1 was further increased). The four cases in which cooperation can evolve
are exactly those cases in which mutual cooperation leads the players to remain in the more profitable
State 1. Interestingly, the evolution of cooperation is strongly tied to the success of WSLS; in all four
stochastic games, cooperation evolves exactly when WSLS is favored by selection.
In Fig. S7, we demonstrate that a similar result also applies in groups of more than two players.
Again, the most abundant strategy is either AllD (when the multiplication factor r1 is too low for coop-
eration to evolve) or WSLS (when r1 is sufficiently large).
3.6 Analytical conditions for the stability of cooperation
The previous numerical results suggest that we can predict when full cooperation can evolve based on
the stability properties of WSLS. In this subsection, we therefore aim to explore when WSLS is an
equilibrium, depending on the game’s transition function and on the payoffs of the stage game. The
following Proposition considers arbitrary state-independent games with m states and n players.
Proposition 2. Consider a state-independent stochastic game between n players with discount rate
0 < δ < 1. Let Q(sj |k) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability to move to state sj ∈ {s1, . . . , sm} after a
round in which k players have cooperated. The strategy WSLS is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and
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Figure S6: An analysis of the evolving strategies for all state-invariant and deterministic stochastic games
with two states and two players suggests that the evolution of cooperation hinges on the success of WSLS.
For each of the eight games depicted in Fig. S4, we have recorded the evolving cooperation rate (lower subpanel)
and the relative abundance of each memory-one strategy (upper subpanel) for different values of b1. For clarity,
we only depict two memory-one strategies explicitly, AllD and WSLS; the color-shaded bars on top of the upper
panels show parameter regimes in which either AllD or WSLS is most abundant among all 16 strategies. In
four out of the eight cases, we observe that full cooperation can evolve as the benefit to cooperation in State 1
approaches b1 = 3. These are exactly the cases in which mutual cooperation leads players towards the more
beneficial State 1. Moreover, in these four cases the upper subpanels show that cooperation emerges due to the
success of WSLS, which is the predominant strategy whenever cooperation prevails. Except for the value of b1, all
other parameter values are the same as in Fig. S4.
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Figure S7: Win-Stay Lose-Shift sustains cooperation in multiplayer public goods games. This figure repre-
sents the analogue of Fig. S6 for the case of multiplayer interactions. Again, we show evolving cooperation rates
and the relative abundance of AllD and WSLS for the six state-independent and deterministic games in which
transitions are monotonic. In five of these games, cooperation emerges once the multiplication factor r1 becomes
sufficiently large; in all of those WSLS is the most abundant strategy when cooperation evolves. Except for r1 all
parameters are the same as in Fig. S5.
only if the following conditions are met in all states si,
uiC,n−1−uiD,n−1+δ
m∑
j=1
(
Q(sj |n)ujC,n−1−Q(sj |n−1)ujD,0
)
+δ2
m∑
j=1
(
Q(sj |n)−Q(sj |0)
)
ujC,n−1 ≥ 0.
uiD,0−uiC,0+δ
m∑
j=1
(
Q(sj |0)ujC,n−1−Q(sj |1)ujD,0
)
+δ2
m∑
j=1
(
Q(sj |n)−Q(sj |0)
)
ujC,n−1 ≥ 0.
(17)
It is worth to note that the above result neither requires the stochastic game to be deterministic, nor
that deviating players choose among the memory-1 strategies. In particular, it implies that if conditions
(17) are satisfied, thenWSLS is a Nash equilibrium, and no single mutant can have a higher payoff than
the residents. Due to continuity, this result remains true in the limiting case of no discounting, δ → 1,
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provided that the payoff of the mutant and of WSLS is well-defined (which always holds when the
mutant applies a memory-k strategy for some finite k).
For the special case of a pairwise game where a prisoner’s dilemma is played in each state, n= 2,
uiC,1 = bi−c, uiC,0 = −c, uiD,1 = bi, uiD,0 = 0, condition (17) simplifies to
δ(1− δ)
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |n) · bj − δ2
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |0) · bj ≥ (1 + δ)c (18)
In particular, if we assume without loss of generality that states are ordered such that b1>b2>. . .>bm,
condition (18) is most easily satisfied if Q(s1|n) = 1 and Q(sm|0) = 1. Thus, we recover the result
that cooperation is most likely to evolve if the stochastic game itself reflects the players’ behavior, with
mutual cooperation always leading to the best state and mutual defection leading to the worst. Moreover,
it follows from (18) that all intermediate transition probabilities Q(sj |k) with 0<k<n are irrelevant for
the stability of WSLS. Even for general games, condition (17) suggests that only the four transitions
Q(sj |n), Q(sj |n−1), Q(sj |1) and Q(sj |0) affect the stability of WSLS. In the limiting case δ → 1,
condition (18) becomes
m∑
j=1
(
2Q(sj |n)−Q(sj |0)
)
· bj ≥ 2c. (19)
In the case of only two states,m = 2, we can write the transitions asQ(s1|k) = qk andQ(s2|k) = 1−qk.
In that case, condition (19) further simplifies to
(
2q2−q0) · b1 +
(
1−(2q2−q0)
) · b2 ≥ 2c. (20)
This is condition (1) in the main text.
Similarly, we can analyze the stability of WSLS if the game played in each state is an n-player
public goods game with decreasing multiplication factors r1>r2> . . . >rm. In that case, condition (17)
translates into
δ(1− δ)
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |n) · rj − δ2
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |0) · rj ≥ 1−rm/n+δ, (21)
which for δ→1 becomes
m∑
j=1
(
2Q(sj |n)−Q(sj |0)
)
· rj ≥ 2− rm/n. (22)
In the case of games with two states only, this condition reads
(
2qn−q0
)· r1 + (1− (2qn−q0))· r2 ≥ 2−rm/n, (23)
For the parameter values used in Fig. S7b–e (n= 4, r2 = 1.2, qn = 1, q0 = 0), this condition becomes
r1 ≥ 1.45, which is roughly the value where we observe WSLS to become favored by selection.
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3.7 An example with many states
In Fig. 4 of the main text, we have introduced a stochastic game with n=4 players and m=5 states. In
each state si players interact in a public goods game with multiplication factor ri and cost c= 1. States
are ordered such that r1≥ . . .≥ rm. Transitions are deterministic and state-independent. Players move
towards State 1 if all four players have cooperated in the previous round, they move towards State 2 if
three players have cooperated, etc. That is, for all previous states si we have
Q(si, 4) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), Q(si, 3) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0), Q(si, 2) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0),
Q(si, 1) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0), Q(si, 0) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
(24)
Due to Proposition 1, we can thus restrict ourselves to state-independent memory-1 strategies of the form
p = (pC,3, pC,2, pC,1, pC,0; pD,3, pD,2, pD,1, pD,0), (25)
where pa,j is a player’s cooperation probability if in the previous round the focal player used action a
and j of the co-players have cooperated. Players are assumed to apply pure strategies with errors, such
that pa,j ∈ {ε, 1−ε}. In total, there are 28 = 256 such strategies. For the payoffs in each state we have
considered four scenarios. These scenarios differ in how the multiplication factors depend on the number
of previous defectors. Specifically, the multiplication factors ri for each scenario are defined as follows
(see also Fig. 4c) :
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 State 5
Scenario with immediate
consequences
1.6 1 1 1 1
Scenario with gradual
consequences
1.6 1.45 1.3 1.15 1
Scenario with delayed
consequences
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1
Scenario with no
consequences
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6.
We have assumed there is no discounting on the future, δ → 1. The model was analyzed by calculat-
ing exact strategy frequencies and cooperation rates in the selection-mutation equilibrium as mutations
become rare54.
We observe that only the first three scenarios yield substantial cooperation rates (Fig. 4), among
which the scenario with immediate consequences yields the highest cooperation rate. This can be un-
derstood on the level of evolving strategies. Applying condition (22) to this example, we find that
WSLS = (1, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 1) is stable in the first three scenarios, whereas it is unstable in the last
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scenario. This stability result is reflected in strategy abundances in the selection-mutation equilibrium.
WSLS is most abundant in the first three scenarios, whereasALLD is the most abundant strategy in the
last scenario. As a consequence, although in each state the multiplication factor in the scenario with im-
mediate consequences is the lowest across all scenarios, players in this scenario earn the highest payoffs
(the payoffs are 0.537, 0.459, 0.401, and 0.089, respectively). Intuitively, although WSLS is an equi-
librium in all of the first three scenarios, the payoff of a single ALLD mutant in a WSLS population
is lowest when consequences are immediate. It follows that also the fixation probability of ALLD in a
WSLS population becomes minimal in this scenario.
3.8 Exploring the impact of different payoff constellations on the game dynamics
In most of our analysis so far we have explored whether stochastic games allow for cooperation even if
cooperation yields lower payoffs in each stage game. In the case of pairwise games with two states, we
have thus assumed that players interact in a prisoner’s dilemma in any given round. In the following, we
weaken this assumption.
We consider a stochastic game with two players and two states. As in the main text, players employ
pure memory-1 strategies subject to rare errors (with the error rate again being ε = 0.001). For the game
in State 2, we suppose players face the same prisoner’s dilemma game as in Fig. 2a. However, for the
game in State 1, we allow more general payoff configurations. Specifically, we assume that the payoffs
in game 1 are given by the following matrix,
U1 =
(
1 S1
T 1 0
)
, (26)
where S1 and T 1 are the sucker’s payoff and the temptation payoff in the first state, respectively. De-
pending on the values of T 1 and S1, we can distinguish four possible cases:
(PD) If T 1 > 1 and S1 < 0, game 1 is a prisoner’s dilemma. Mutual defection is the only equilibrium
in the corresponding one-shot game.
(SH) If T 1 < 1 and S1 < 0, game 1 corresponds to a stag-hunt game. In that case, the one-shot game
corresponds to a coordination game with three equilibria, both cooperate, both defect, and a mixed
equilibrium.
(SD) If T 1 > 1 and S1 > 0, game 1 corresponds to a snowdrift game. In the one-shot case, this game
has one symmetric equilibrium according to which players randomize between cooperation and
defection.
(HG) If T 1 < 1 and S1 > 0, mutual cooperation is the only equilibrium. This game is thus sometimes
called harmony game.
We are interested in how the evolution of cooperation and the dynamics of play is affected by the
payoff values and the game’s transition structure. To this end, we have systematically varied the two
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payoff parameters S1 and T 1, and we have considered all eight state-independent and deterministic
transitions q = (q2, q1, q0) with qi ∈ {0, 1}. For each combination of S1, T 1 and q, we calculate exact
strategy frequencies in the selection-mutation equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes rare54. Based
on these strategy frequencies, we compute (i) how often players cooperate on average and (ii) how often
they switch between states over the course of a game (i.e., in which fraction of rounds players move from
State 1 to State 2 or vice versa). The corresponding results are shown in Fig. S8.
We observe the following regularities:
1. High cooperation rates are only feasible in those stochastic games in which mutual cooperation
leads to the first state (i.e., for which q2 = 1, as in Fig. S8a,b,c,e). In those four cases, players
tend to be fully cooperative in the harmony game and in the stag-hunt game. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, players are most likely to establish cooperation if the sucker’s payoff S1 is large and the
temptation T 1 is small. Moreover, cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma is more likely to evolve
when mutual defection leads players to the second state (as in Fig. S8b,c). In this regime, the most
abundant strategy is Win-Stay Lose Shift, which is in line with the results reported in Section 3.6.
Finally, for the snowdrift game we observe that players may learn to cooperate alternatingly, pro-
vided that unilateral cooperation leads to the more profitable State 1 (Fig. S8a,b). Otherwise, if
unilateral cooperation leads to the second state, players are either fully cooperative or fully defec-
tive (Fig. S8c,e).
Interestingly, in the four cases in which mutual cooperation leads to the first state, players rarely
switch between the two states, independent of the particular game being played in State 1. That
is, players either adopt strategies that make them stay in the first state, or they adopt strategies that
make them stay in the second state.
2. The only cases when players learn to alternate between the two states occur when mutual coop-
eration leads to the second state whereas mutual defection leads to the first state (Fig. S8d,f). In
those two cases there are regions in the (T 1, S1)–plane where players cooperate in the first game
and defect in the second. These switches between states resemble the oscillating tragedy of the
commons reported by Weitz et al10. In their analysis of one-shot games with environmental feed-
back, they have observed persistent oscillations as the game payoffs switch between a harmony
game and a prisoner’s dilemma (see also Appendix A). In contrast, Fig. S8d,f suggests that simi-
lar oscillations can occur in stochastic games even if the first game is a stag-hunt game, provided
that the sucker’s payoff S1 is sufficiently large.
3. Finally, if mutual cooperation and mutual defection both lead to the unprofitable second state,
cooperation rarely evolves (Fig. S8g,h). Only if the game under consideration is a snowdrift game
and if unilateral cooperation leads to the first state, players may sometimes learn to cooperate
asynchronously (Fig. S8g).
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Figure S8: A systematic analysis of the expected game dynamics for different game payoffs. For each of the
eight possible state-independent transitions q, we have systematically varied the temptation payoff T 1 (x-axis)
and the sucker’s payoff S1 (y-axis) in the first state. For each combination of T 1, S1, and q we have computed
how often players cooperate in the selection-mutation equilibrium (left panel) and in which fraction of rounds they
switch from one state to the other (right panel). Depending on T 1 and S1, game 1 can be one of four different
types: harmony game (HG), snowdrift game (SD), stag-hunt game (SH), and prisoner’s dilemma (PD). a,b,c,e,
Full cooperation can evolve when players find themselves in State 1 after mutual cooperation. d,f Players learn to
switch between states only when mutual cooperation leads to State 2 and mutual defection leads to State 1. g,h In
the remaining cases, players hardly cooperate. Parameters: The payoffs in game 2 are the same as in Fig. 2a, a
prisoner’s dilemma with b2 = 1.2 and c= 1. For the evolutionary parameters we have considered population size
N=100 and selection strength β=1.
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4 Further applications
In the following, we discuss several further examples where the framework of stochastic games can be
used to shed light on cooperation in specific scenarios. All examples have in common that they are
state-dependent: transitions do not only depend on the players’ previous actions but also on the present
state. Examples 1–3 explore the impact of probabilistic transitions on cooperation; the fourth example
illustrates the dynamics in a state-dependent stochastic game with more than two states.
4.1 A stochastic game with probabilistic return to State 1
Here we consider the stochastic game illustrated in Fig. 3a of the main text. There are two players,
N = {1, 2} and the game has two states S = {s1, s2}. Players remain in the first state after mutual
cooperation, but they move to the second state if at least one player defects. Once players are in the
second state, they return to the first state after mutual cooperation with probability q; otherwise they
remain in the second state. That is, the transition function is given by
q = (q12, q
1
1, q
1
0; q
2
2, q
2
1, q
2
0) := (1, 0, 0; q, 0, 0), (27)
where qik is the probability to move to the first state, given that the present state is si and that k players
have cooperated. In each state i, players interact in a prisoner’s dilemma; the payoffs are uiCC = bi−c,
uiCD =−c, uiDC = bi, and uiDD =0. Cooperation in State 1 is more profitable, since b1>b2>c. Players
are assumed to use memory-one strategies; that is, admissible strategies are 5-tuples of the form
p = (p1CC ; p
2
CC , p
2
CD, p
2
DC , p
2
DD). (28)
The entries piaa˜ represent a player’s cooperation probability in state si, given that the focal player’s
previous action was a and that the co-player’s action was a˜. Note that we can omit the cooperation
probabilities p1CD, p
1
DC and p
1
DD due to Proposition 1 (players never find themselves in the first state if
a player has defected in the previous round). Moreover, since we consider the limit of no discounting on
future payoffs, δ→ 1, we can also omit a player’s initial cooperation probability p0. In the following,
we assume that players use pure strategies with errors. That is, the entries are taken from the set piaa˜ ∈
{ε, 1−ε}. Hence, the strategy space contains 25 = 32 different strategies. For given parameter values
b1, b2, c, q, we use the method of Fudenberg and Imhof54 to calculate the abundance of each strategy in
the selection-mutation equilibrium. As we have illustrated in Fig. 3a, there are parameter combinations
in which it takes an intermediate value of q to achieve maximum payoffs in the population.
Here, we discuss this result in terms of the strategies that evolve. For the most abundant strategy, we
find there are three different regimes depending on the transition probability q (see Fig. S9c). When q
is close to zero, the most abundant strategy is AllD = (0; 0, 0, 0, 0); as q increases, the most abundant
strategy becomes WSLS = (1; 1, 0, 0, 1); and for sufficiently large values of q, the most abundant
strategies is a more ambitious version of win-stay lose-shift, which we call AWSLS = (1; 0, 0, 0, 1).
27
Stochastic game
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Transition probability q
Co
op
er
at
ion
 ra
te
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
10−1
100
101
AllDWSLS
AWSLS
Re
lat
ive
 a
bu
nd
an
ce
Transition probability q
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
101
102
103
104
AllD
WSLS
AWSLS
Ti
m
e 
un
til 
inv
as
ion
Transition probability q
0.2
0.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1CC
2CC
2CD
2DC
2DD
Ab
un
da
nc
e 
of
su
cc
es
sfu
l m
ut
an
ts Distribution of mutants
that invade into AllD for q=1
0.2
0.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1CC
2CC
2CD
2DC
2DD
Ab
un
da
nc
e 
of
su
cc
es
sfu
l m
ut
an
ts Distribution of mutants
that invade into WSLS for q=1
a
b
c
d
e
f
1C,0C 
2C 
2C (1-q) 
1C 
0C 
2C (Prob. q) 
C D 
C b1-c -c 
D b1 0 
C D 
C b2-c -c 
D b2 0 
Figure S9: Probabilistic transitions can further enhance cooperation. a, We consider a stochastic game in
which any defection leads to State 2. After mutual cooperation in State 1, players remain in State 1 with certainty.
After mutual cooperation in State 2, players move towards State 1 with probability q. b, Calculating the cooperation
rate in the selection-mutation equilibrium in the limit of rare mutations shows that the highest cooperation rate is
achieved for intermediate values of q. c, We have recorded the abundance of all 32 memory-one strategies in the
selection-mutation equilibrium. The most abundant strategy is either AllD (for small values of q, as indicated
by the red squares), WSLS (for small but positive values of q, green circles), or AWSLS (for all other q-values,
yellow triangles). d, To estimate the time it takes each resident strategy to be invaded, we have randomly introduced
other mutant strategies, and we have recorded how long it takes until a mutant successfully fixes. To get a reliable
estimate, we have performed 10,000 runs for each resident strategy. e,f, In addition, we have also recorded which
strategy eventually reaches fixation if the resident either appliesAllD orWSLS when q=1. Parameters: b1=1.9,
b2=1.4, c=1, β=1, N=100.
An AWSLS player continues with her previous action if and only if the previous payoff was at least
b1−c; otherwise she takes the opposite action in the next round (an ordinary WSLS player follows the
same principle, but uses the more modest threshold b2−c).
To explore why the highest cooperation rate evolves for intermediate values of q (Fig. S9b), we have
simulated how long it takes other mutant strategies to invade one of these three resident populations. For a
resident population consisting of AllD players, we find that it takes approximately 200 mutant invasions
until the first mutant successfully reaches fixation, with little dependence on q (Fig. S9d). WSLS and
AWSLS are less robust for small values of q. For q = 0, AWSLS is on average invaded after 17
mutants, and WSLS fares only slightly better, surviving on average 24 mutants. This is intuitive – for
q=0 the second state of the stochastic game becomes absorbing. Hence, the stochastic game degenerates
to a repeated game in the second state, in which the benefit b2 is too low for WSLS or AWSLS to be
stable. As q increases, both strategies become stable, which is also reflected by a considerably longer
invasion time. In the limiting case q = 1, the stochastic game becomes state-independent, and the two
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strategiesWSLS andAWSLS are equivalent (since they only differ in their value of p2CC which now is
irrelevant). For q=1, we hence find for both strategies that it takes approximately 930 mutant invasions
until a mutant takes over the population.
To explore further why the value for the optimal transition probability is smaller than one, we have
also recorded which strategies typically succeed in invadingAllD (Fig. S9e) andWSLS (Fig. S9f) when
q=1. AllD is typically invaded by TFT -like strategies. Successful mutants defect if the co-player has
defected, and they cooperate if the co-player has cooperated. In this way, TFT can be shown to have a
selective advantage among AllD players; its invasion probability is above the neutral probability 1/N
for all values of q. On the other hand, forWSLS we find that the most successful mutant usually applies
AWSLS, and vice versa AWSLS is typically invaded by WSLS (since they both are neutral to each
other when q= 1). However, the second most successful mutant strategy turns out not to be AllD, but
rather the slightly more cooperative strategy p = (0; x, 0, 0, 1) with x ∈ {0, 1} arbitrary (Fig. S9f). For
x = 0, the payoff of such a strategy in a WSLS population can be calculated as
pi =
b2 − c+ qb1 + (1−q)b2
3
+O(ε) (29)
Hence, for q = 1, this strategy achieves the higher benefit b1 in every third round (while it receives
the mutual defection payoff 0 and the mutual cooperation payoff b2 − c in the other two rounds). By
decreasing the value of q, the mutant’s payoff pi is reduced, which explains why smaller values of q
enhance the stability of WSLS and AWSLS.
For q close to one, we observe that WSLS is slightly less abundant than AWSLS (Fig. S9c). When
the population consists of a mixture of these two strategies, everyone gets the mutual cooperation payoff
b1−c as the error rate goes to zero ε → 0. However, for positive error rates, the competition between
WSLS andAWSLS becomes a coordination game, in whichAWSLS is risk-dominant57. Thus, when
q is close to but below one, we find that AWSLS is favored by selection in a WSLS population (it has
a fixation probability above 1/N ), whereas WSLS is disfavored in an AWSLS population.
We have also explored for which payoffs probabilistic transitions are particularly favorable to coop-
eration. To this end, we have simultaneously varied the benefit in the second state b2∈ [1, 2], and we have
varied how much the first state is preferred, b1−b2 ∈ [0, 1], see Fig. S9. We observe that for probabilistic
transitions to be beneficial, the value of b2 should be intermediate, and the relative advantage of the first
state b1 − b2 should decrease as b2 increases. Intuitively, if b2 and b1 − b2 are too small, cooperation is
unlikely to evolve even with probabilistic transitions. On the other hand, as either b2 or b1 − b2 become
large, almost full cooperation can already be established with deterministic transitions.
Overall, this example illustrates how probabilistic transitions can further enhance the prospects of
cooperation. When the transition towards State 1 depends on exogenous chance events, it takes on
average more time to reach the more beneficial state after one player has defected. This renders deviations
from mutual cooperation more costly.
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Figure S10: Probabilistic transitions are favorable for intermediate benefit values. For this graph, we have
varied the benefit of cooperation in the second state (x-axis) and the relative payoff advantage of the first state (y-
axis). We have compared two scenarios: the payoff that players obtain in the selection-mutation equilibrium when
players always return to the first state after mutual cooperation (q = 1), and the maximum payoff that players
obtain when q can take arbitrary values between 0 and 1. The figure shows a, the relative payoff advantage of
probabilistic transitions, and b, the value of q that guarantees the highest payoff to the population. Both panels
indicate that probabilistic transitions are most favorable if b2 is between 1 and 1.8, and b1 is between 1.8 and 2.2
(such that there is an inverse relationship between b2 and b1− b2). Except for the benefit values, all parameters are
the same as in the previous figure.
4.2 A repeated game with endogenous stopping time
As another example, we have considered a scenario in which defections of a player may lead a repeated
game to end earlier (as introduced in Fig. 3b of the main text). Again there are two players N = {1, 2}
and two states S = {s1, s2}. After mutual cooperation, players remain in the first state. However, if one
of the players defects, players move to the second state with probability q. State 2 is absorbing. Hence,
the transition function is represented by the vector
q = (q12, q
1
1, q
1
0; q
2
2, q
2
1, q
2
0) := (1, 1−q, 1−q; 0, 0, 0), (30)
While in State 1, players interact in a prisoner’s dilemma with payoffs u1CC =b1−c, u1CD=−c, u1DC =b1,
and u1DD = 0. In State 2, there are no profitable interactions and u
2
aa˜ = 0, irrespective of the players’
actions. As the second state is absorbing, this stochastic game is only meaningful for discount factors
δ < 1 (otherwise the payoff of any strategy with errors will eventually approach 0). Thus, memory-one
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Figure S11: Players benefit from a small endogenous risk that the game stops early. a, We consider a stochas-
tic game in which players remain in State 1 after cooperation, but move towards State 2 with transition probability
q if one of the player defects. In State 2 no profitable interactions are possible, the game is over. b, According
to our evolutionary simulations, a higher transition probability leads to more cooperation. c, However, a higher
probability q also makes players move to the second state if one of the players merely defected due to an error;
hence the dependence of payoffs on q is non-monotonic. d,e, When q is small, Grim is the predominant strategy.
As q increases, WSLS strategies take over. As q approaches one, unconditional cooperation becomes most suc-
cessful. f, For the given parameter values, a homogeneous Grim population only achieves 1/3 of the maximum
payoff possible, since any error leads to relentless defection. The other three strategies get the maximum payoff
b1 − c for q=0, but this payoff decreases with q. Parameters: b1=2, c=1, δ=0.999, ε=0.001, β=1, N=100.
strategies for this example have the following form,
p = (p0; p
1
CC , p
1
CD, p
1
DC , p
1
DD). (31)
Again, we focus on pure memory-one strategies with errors, yielding 25 = 32 different strategies in total.
In the main text (Fig. 3b) we have shown that evolving payoffs reach an optimum for intermediate
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values of the transition probability q. Herein, we aim to explain this finding on the level of evolving
strategies. To this end, we again consider the limit of small mutation rates and we use the method of
Fudenberg and Imhof54 to calculate, for each value of q, how abundant each strategy is in the selection-
mutation equilibrium. For small values of q, we find thatGrim = (1; 1, 0, 0, 0) is the memory-1 strategy
most favored by selection (Fig. S11d) . However, in Grim populations, cooperation is unstable: once
a player defects by error, cooperation breaks down and from then on both players receive a payoff of
zero (independent of whether they remain in State 1 or move towards State 2). We can use Eq. (12) to
calculate payoffs in a homogeneous Grim population. For q=0 we obtain
piG =
1− δ(1− ε)(1 + δε(1− 2ε))
1− δ(1− 2ε) (b1 − c), (32)
which for our parameter values yields piG ≈ 0.334 · (b1− c) (see also Fig. S11f) . That is, homogeneous
Grim populations only achieve an average cooperation rate of 33%. The predominance of Grim for
q ≈ 0 thus explains the relatively low cooperation rates (Fig. S11b) and payoffs (Fig. S11c) in the
selection-mutation equilibrium.
As q increases, the two strategiesWSLS=(1; 1, 0, 0, 1) and its more suspicious counterpart SWSLS=
(0; 1, 0, 0, 1) become favored by selection. To get some intuitive insight into why these strategies emerge,
we use Eq. (12) to calculate when WSLS becomes stable. The respective condition reads
q ≥ 1−
√
δb1 − c
δ2(b1 − c) +O(ε). (33)
For our parameter values, the expression under the square root is approximately one, and hence the
critical q value is of the order of ε, which explains the rise of WSLS in Fig. S11d as the transition
probability approaches q=0.001. For such q, the payoff of homogeneous WSLS populations is close to
the optimal b1 − c (Fig. S11e) , and hence we also see sharp increase of population payoffs (Fig. S11c) .
As the transition probability q increases even further, cooperative strategies become increasingly
successful. Using Eq. (12) we find that AllC can resist invasion of AllD if
q ≥ 1− δ
δ
c
b1 − c +O(ε). (34)
However, despite the success of cooperative strategies, average payoffs begin to diminish once q passes
a critical threshold (Fig. S11c) . Even if all players are unconditional cooperators, occasional failures
to cooperate will often terminate the interaction prematurely, with negative effects on the expected pay-
offs (Fig. S11f) .
Overall, this example illustrates the mechanisms that promote cooperation if the length of a game is
not exogenously given, but endogenously determined by the players. If defective relationships have a
higher risk to be terminated, even unconditional cooperation can become a stable outcome, provided that
future interactions are sufficiently valuable.
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4.3 A model with time-out
As our next application, we consider a model with time-out (illustrated in Fig. 3c of the main text).
There are again two players, N = {1, 2}, and two states, S = {s1, s2}. Players remain in State 1 after
mutual cooperation and they move towards State 2 otherwise. Once in State 2, they return to State 1 with
probability q, independent of the players’ actions. The transition function is thus
q = (q12, q
1
1, q
1
0; q
2
2, q
2
1, q
2
0) := (1, 0, 0; q, q, q), (35)
In State 1, players interact in a conventional prisoner’s dilemma with payoffs u1CC = b1−c, u1CD =−c,
u1DC = b1, and u
1
DD = 0. In the time-out State 2, payoffs are zero u
2
aa˜ = 0 for all a, a˜ ∈ {C,D}. We
can obtain analytical results for the dynamics when we focus on games without discounting (δ → 1) and
when we consider players that only base their action in State 1 on the previous state. They use the regular
cooperation probability x if the previous state was s1, and they use the cooperation probability y after
returning to state 1 from the time-out state 2. We can represent such strategies (x, y) in our framework by
assuming without loss of generality that players always defect when in State 2. in that case, the strategy
(x, y) can be encoded as the memory-one strategy
p = (p1CC , p
1
CD, p
1
DC , p
1
DD; p
2
CC , p
2
CD, p
2
DC , p
2
DD) = (x, 0, 0, y; 0, 0, 0, 0). (36)
When an (x1, y1)-mutant interacts with an (x2, y2)-resident, we can thus use Eq. (12) to calculate player
1’s expected payoff,
pi1 = q · (1−x1x2+x2y1)y2b1 − (1−x1x2+x1y2)y1c
(1 + q)(1− x1x2)− qy1y2 . (37)
To model the evolution of strategies in the population, we assume that the population is of infinite size,
and that emerging mutant strategies are close to the respective resident strategy. Considering the adaptive
dynamics62 of the system, we assume that the direction of evolution points towards the mutant with
highest invasion fitness. That is, the time evolution of some resident population (x, y) is given by the
dynamical system
x˙ =
∂pi1
∂x1
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x, y1=y2=y
and y˙ =
∂pi1
∂y1
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x, y1=y2=y
(38)
Plugging Eq.(37) into (38), we obtain the system
x˙ = qy2 · x(x+ qx− qy)b1 − (1 + q − xy + y
2)c(
(1 + q)(1− x2)− qy2)2 ,
y˙ = q(1− x)2 · ((1 + q)xy − qy
2)b1 − (1 + q)(1− x2 + xy)c(
(1 + q)(1− x2)− qy2)2 ,
(39)
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which is defined on the unit square [0, 1]2. In Fig. 3c, we show a phase portrait of this system for b1 = 3,
c = 1 and q = 1/2. By solving for x˙ = 0 and y˙ = 0, we find a unique interior fixed point which is
always on the main diagonal,
Q =
√(1 + q)c
b1
,
√
(1 + q)c
b1
 . (40)
In Fig. 3c, the fixed point Q is represented by a purple dot. By linearizing the system around Q, we find
that the trace of the Jacobian matrix is positive, and hence Q is unstable.63 A numerical analysis shows
that the global dynamics is bistable. Some orbits converge to the line segment (x, 0) with 0 ≤ x < 1;
this line comprises all strategies that defect against themselves. Otherwise orbits converge towards the
line segment (1, y) with 0 < y ≤ min{1, yˆ}, where
yˆ =
−q(b1 − c) +
√
q(b1 − c)(4c+ 3qc+ qb1)
2cq
. (41)
In particular, if q ≤ (b1 − c)/c we find that AllC = (1, 1) is a stable fixed point of the dynamics. Thus,
the longer players stay in the time-out state in expectation, the more likely it becomes thatAllC becomes
a stable equilibrium. As in the previous example, however, the average payoff in an AllC population
with rare errors is a decreasing function of q. Hence, for the evolution of high payoffs in the population it
is again optimal that q is sufficiently small (increasing the size of the basin of attraction of cooperation),
but positive (preventing the second state with no payoffs to be absorbing).
4.4 A stochastic game with delayed payoff feedback
So far we have considered examples in which players revise their actions at the same timescale at which
payoff changes occur. However, in many natural applications it may be more realistic to assume there is
some delay in the payoff consequences of an action. For example, when farmers overgraze a shared pas-
ture, the consequences may not be visible after a day but only after a week. Such delayed consequences
can be captured by introducing additional states to the stochastic game. In the following, we illustrate
this technique with a simple example.
We consider a state-dependent stochastic game with two players N = {1, 2} and three states, S =
{s1, s2, s3}, see Fig. S12a. Mutual cooperation always leads to the neighboring state with lower index
(unless players are already in state s1, in which case they stay there after mutual cooperation). Mutual
defection always leads to a state with higher index (unless players already find themselves in the third
state). If only one player defects, players remain in the same state. Hence, the transition functionQ takes
the following values
Q
(
s1, (C,C)
)
= (1, 0, 0), Q
(
s2, (C,C)
)
= (1, 0, 0), Q
(
s3, (C,C)
)
= (0, 1, 0)
Q
(
s1, (C,D)
)
= (1, 0, 0), Q
(
s2, (C,D)
)
= (0, 1, 0), Q
(
s3, (C,D)
)
= (0, 0, 1)
Q
(
s1, (D,C)
)
= (1, 0, 0), Q
(
s2, (D,C)
)
= (0, 1, 0), Q
(
s3, (D,C)
)
= (0, 0, 1)
Q
(
s1, (D,D)
)
= (0, 1, 0), Q
(
s2, (D,D)
)
= (0, 0, 1), Q
(
s3, (D,D)
)
= (0, 0, 1).
(42)
34
Given these transitions, it is impossible that players find themselves in s1 after mutual defection, or
that they find themselves in s3 after mutual cooperation. Due to Proposition 1, memory-1 strategies are
therefore given by 10-tuples,
p = (p1CC , p
1
CD, p
1
DC ; p
2
CC , p
2
CD, p
2
DC , p
2
DD; p
3
CD, p
3
DC , p
3
DD). (43)
As in the first two examples, we consider pure strategies with errors, such that piaa˜ ∈ {ε, 1−ε}. In total,
there are 210 = 1, 024 such strategies. For the payoffs in each state we consider four scenarios that are
similar to the scenarios in Section 3.7. In all scenarios and all states, cooperation leads to a cost c for
the cooperator. The benefits of cooperation depend on the scenario and on the state as follows (see also
Fig. S12a):
State 1 State 2 State 3
Scenario with immediate
consequences
b1 c c
Scenario with gradual
consequences
b1
b1+c
2 c
Scenario with delayed
consequences
b1 b1 c
Scenario with no
consequences
b1 b1 b1.
Again, we analyze this model by calculating exact strategy frequencies and cooperation rates in the
selection-mutation equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes rare54.
As shown in Fig. S12b, immediate payoff consequences are most favorable to cooperation for all
considered benefit values c < b1 ≤ 3c. As a consequence, this scenario also yields the highest payoffs,
given that benefits exceed a moderate threshold, b1 ≥ 1.4 (Fig. S12c). However, even when payoff
consequences are delayed, cooperation rates and payoffs are still higher than in the case when there are
no payoff consequences at all. On the level of evolving strategies, we observe that across all scenarios
and all benefit values, five different strategies are most abundant:
p72 = (0, 0, 0; 1, 0, 0, 1; 0, 0, 0),
p577 = (1, 0, 0; 1, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 1),
p585 = (1, 0, 0; 1, 0, 0, 1; 0, 0, 1)
p586 = (1, 0, 0; 1, 0, 0, 1; 0, 1, 0)
p588 = (1, 0, 0; 1, 0, 0, 1; 1, 0, 0)
(44)
The index of each memory-one strategy indicates the decimal representation of the binary strategy en-
tries. The strategy p72 is self-defective; if applied by everyone in the population, players find themselves
in the third state most of the time, in which they mutually defect on each other. In contrast, the four other
35
Be
ne
fit 
b i
b1
c
bi−c
bi
−c
0
C
D
C D
State 1 State 2 State 3
Gradual
Delayed
Immediate
None
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Co
op
er
at
ion
ra
te
None
Delayed
Gradual
Immediate
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ef
fic
ien
cy
Benefit in state 1
None
Delayed
Gradual
Immediate
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
10−1
100
101
102
Re
lat
ive
 a
bu
nd
an
ce
Immediate
72 586 588 577 585
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
10−1
100
101
102
Re
lat
ive
 a
bu
nd
an
ce
Gradual
72 586588 577
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
10−1
100
101
102
Re
lat
ive
 a
bu
nd
an
ce
Benefit in state 1
Delayed
72 586588 577
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
10−1
100
101
102
Re
lat
ive
 a
bu
nd
an
ce
Benefit in state 1
None
72 586 588 577
a Structure of stochastic game b
c
d f
e g2C	 2C	
0C	 0C	
Game 3 Game 2 Game 1 
1C	 1C,0C	2C,1C	
Figure S12: Immediate environmental feedback enhances cooperation. a, We consider a state-dependent
stochastic game with three states. Mutual cooperation always leads players to move to a superior state (or to
remain in the most beneficial state s1). Similarly, mutual defection always leads to an inferior state (or players
remain in the most detrimental state s3). After a unilateral defection, players remain in the same state. We consider
four different versions of this game, depending on how quickly the payoffs decrease as players move towards an
inferior state. b, Our numerical results show that an immediate negative response of the environment to defection
is most favorable to the evolution of cooperation. c, As a consequence, the scenario with immediate consequences
also yields the highest average payoffs once the benefit in State 1 exceeds a moderate threshold. d–g, On the level
of evolving strategies, we find that an immediately responding environment is most favorable to the evolution of
WSLS strategies, and strongly selects against defecting strategies. Again, the colored bars on top of each panel
indicate the strategy that is most favored by selection for the respective value of b1. Parameters: c= 1; b1 varies
between 1 and 3; b2 is equal to c, (b1+c)/2 and b1; and b3 is either equal to c or to b1 depending on the considered
scenario (as depicted in panel a). N=100, β=1, δ → 1, ε=0.001.
strategies are self-cooperative. Strategy p585 isWSLS; the other three strategies representWSLS with
minor adaptations. In Fig. S12d–g, we show how well these strategies fare in the four different scenarios
considered. When the benefit b1 is relatively low, we note that the WSLS-like strategies evolve most
readily in the scenario with immediate consequences of defection.
To check whether our results are sensitive to the assumption that the benefit in the third state was
set to c, we have computed the resulting cooperation rates for an alternative scenario. In this alternative
scenario, we again set b1 = 1.8 as in Fig. S12, but the benefit in the third state is b3 = 1.4 for the three
scenarios in which payoffs change (again, b2 is either equal to 1.8, 1.6, or 1.4). In that case we obtain
the cooperation rates 62.8% (immediate consequences), 57.0% (gradual consequences), 52.6% (delayed
consequences) and 45.3% (no consequences, which is the same as before). Again, an immediate feedback
proves best for cooperation, but even some delayed feedback can prove beneficial.
The question of delayed payoff feedback may become more consequential if players heavily discount
the future. While the numerical results shown in Fig. S12 assume the limiting case of no discounting,
Fig. S13 systematically explores how the evolving cooperation rates depend on the discount rate and on
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Figure S13: Cooperation in stochastic games requires that players sufficiently take future payoff conse-
quences into account. We have repeated the numerical computations in Fig. S12 for various discount rates δ.
When players entirely focus on the present, such that δ = 0, cooperation evolves in none of the four treatments.
As players increasingly take future payoffs into account, cooperation rates increase. Immediate payoff feedback is
most conducive to cooperation across all considered values of δ. Parameters are the same as in Fig. S12.
the exact shape of the payoff feedback. As one may expect, none of the four treatments allows for the
evolution of cooperation when players only value their present payoffs, such that δ→0. As we increase
the extent to which players take future payoffs into account, all four treatments exhibit more cooperation.
The relative ranking of the treatments is the same as before: immediate payoff consequences lead to the
highest cooperation rates and no payoff consequences exhibit the lowest cooperation rates. However, the
differences between the four treatments are more distinct, as compared to Fig. S12. We conclude that
stochastic games are most conducive to cooperation if players put sufficient weight on future payoffs,
and if the time lag between the players’ actions and the resulting payoff feedback is sufficiently short.
On a more technical level, this example highlights that our framework is not restricted to simple state-
dependent games with two states only. Instead, it is often possible to calculate exact strategy frequencies
in games with multiple states, especially if transitions are deterministic (such that one can often use
Proposition 1 to reduce the size of the strategy space).
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Appendix A: On the feasibility of cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas
With our study we aim to highlight that the interplay of reciprocity and payoff feedback can be crucial
to sustain cooperation. To this end, Fig. 2 of the main text has illustrated the critical role of payoff
feedback: in these examples, players learn to cooperate in the stochastic game (where payoff feedback
is present), whereas they predominantly defect in the two associated repeated games (without payoff
feedback). In this appendix we wish to illustrate the critical role of repeated interactions: cooperation
cannot be sustained if there is only payoff feedback but players lack a long term perspective. Players
need to take the future consequences of their actions into account for cooperation to evolve.
To make this point more rigorous, we revisit the model of Weitz et al10 (to allow for an easy com-
parison, we adopt their notation in the following). They consider an infinite and well-mixed population.
Players interact in a pairwise game with two possible actions, C and D. In contrast to our setup, the
game is not repeated; if a player is a cooperator, this player is assumed to play C independent of the
other players’ previous decisions and independent of any environmental cues. The frequency of coop-
erators in the population is denoted by x∈ [0, 1]. The players’ payoffs depend on their own actions, on
the frequency of cooperators x, and on their current environment. The current state of the environment
is represented by the continuous variable n∈ [0, 1]. The payoff matrix A(n) for a given environment n
is assumed to be a linear combination of two borderline cases (see their Eq. [18]),
A(n) =
(
R(n) S(n)
T (n) P (n)
)
:= (1− n)
(
R0 S0
T0 P0
)
+ n
(
R1 S1
T1 P1
)
. (45)
Using the above payoff matrix, the payoffs of the two player types are defined as
r1
(
x,A(n)
)
= xR(n) + (1−x)S(n),
r2
(
x,A(n)
)
= xT (n) + (1−x)P (n).
(46)
To model how cooperation and the environment co-evolve, they consider the following two-dimensional
version of the replicator equation (see their Eq. [20]),
x˙ = x(1−x)
[
r1
(
x,A(n)
)− r2(x,A(n))],
n˙ = εn(1−n)[− 1 + (1 + θ)x]. (47)
The parameter ε > 0 reflects the relative speed at which the environment changes, as compared to the
strategy dynamics. The parameter θ > 0 reflects the recovery of the environment when cooperators are
common (i.e., when x ≈ 1). According to the first equation, the fraction of cooperators increases if
and only if cooperators receive a higher payoff than defectors, such that r1
(
x,A(n)
)
> r2
(
x,A(n)
)
.
According to the second equation, the environmental parameter increases if and only if there are suffi-
ciently many cooperators, such that x > 1/(1+θ). Weitz et al10 observe that if cooperation is a dominant
strategy for n= 0 and if defection is a dominant strategy for n= 1, the dynamics according to (47) can
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exhibit persistent oscillations.
We note that the replicator equation (47) considers players who maximize their current payoff. When
cooperators yield a one-shot payoff below average, they tend to switch to the other strategy. This switch
of actions may then in turn affect the dynamics of the environmental parameter n and the strategy choices
of other players. However, whether such a switch is profitable is exclusively evaluated based on its
immediate payoff effects. The subsequent strategy and environmental dynamics is not taken into account
when players decide whether to switch to a different strategy.
Due to these differences, the framework of Weitz et al10 is not immediately applicable to the ex-
amples we have studied. But to illustrate the differences between the two frameworks, we can naively
use their model to analyze the two-player example depicted in Fig. 2a of the main text, by studying the
solutions of (47) for the payoff values used in Fig. 2a,
R0 =b1−c, S0 = −c, T0 = b1, P0 = 0,
R1 =b2−c, S1 = −c, T1 = b2, P1 = 0.
(48)
For this special case, the replicator equation (47) simplifies to
x˙ = −cx(1−x),
n˙ = εn(1−n)[− 1 + (1 + θ)x]. (49)
For the special payoff values considered, the first equation becomes independent of n (because defectors
always have the constant payoff advantage c over cooperators, independent of the current environment).
Since c>0, it follows for 0<x<1 that x˙<0. As a consequence, x(t)→ 0 for any solution of (49) with
0≤ x(0) < 1 and 0≤ n(0)≤ 1. We conclude that for any initial population in the interior of the state
space, cooperators eventually go extinct. Fig. S14 provides an illustration of this result, and compares
the replicator dynamics (47) with the evolutionary dynamics of stochastic games as presented in Fig. 2a.
This extinction result is not restricted to the specific payoff values in (48). Instead, Weitz et al10 show
that when both games constitute a prisoner’s dilemma, with Ti > Ri and Pi > Si for i ∈ {0, 1}, then
cooperation always goes extinct.
We can slightly generalize this extinction result in the following way. Instead, of Eq. (47), suppose
the evolutionary dynamics of x and n is governed by the following system of equations,
x˙ = x(1−x)
[
r1(x, n)− r2(x, n)
]
,
n˙ = εn(1−n)ϕ(x, n),
(50)
where r1(x, n), r2(x, n) and ϕ(x, n) are differentiable functions in x and n. The ordinary differential
equation (50) generalizes Eq. (47) in two ways. First, it does not specify the exact form of the payoff
functions r1(x, n) and r2(x, n). In particular, a player’s payoff may be a nonlinear function of the frac-
tion of cooperators in a population, or of the environmental state. In this way, the replicator equation (50)
can be used to capture the dynamics of multiplayer games59. Second, we do no longer assume a specific
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Figure S14: When players face a social dilemma in each state, environmental feedback may not suffice to
sustain cooperation. We compare the deterministic dynamics (47) for one-shot games with our results presented
in Fig. 2a for stochastic games. a, The blue curve shows the numerically computed solution of (47) for the initial
state x=n=0.5. For comparison, we additionally show two solutions of the standard replicator equation assuming
that the environment is fixed (at either n= 0 or n= 1) and payoffs do not co-evolve. All trajectories lead to full
defection. b, While the repeated game 1 and the repeated game 2 lead to defection, the stochastic game facilitates
cooperation. Parameters: a, We use the payoffs of Fig. 2a of our main text, b1 = 1.8, b2 = 1.2, and c= 1. For the
evolutionary parameters we use ε=0.1 and θ=2, as in Fig. 2 of Weitz et al10. b, This panel reproduces our results
from Fig. 2a. For better comparison with panel a, initially all players use a random initial strategy.
functional form to describe the dynamics of the environment; the function ϕ(x, n) is only assumed to be
differentiable, which is merely needed to guarantee existence and uniqueness of solutions of (50). We
obtain the following result for the case that players are always engaged in a social dilemma.
Claim. Suppose one-shot payoffs are such that r1(x, n)≤ r2(x, n) for all x and n, and let
(
x(t), n(t)
)
be a solution of the replicator equation (50). Then x(t) is monotonically decreasing. Moreover, if
r1(x, n)<r2(x, n) for all x and n, then x(t)→0 for all initial populations with x(0)<1.
Proof. The statement follows directly because x˙ = x(1−x)
[
r1(x, n)− r2(x, n)
]
≤0 by assumption. If
r1(x, n)<r2(x, n), then V (x) :=x is a Lyapunov function for 0≤x<1.
In all of our examples in the main text we have assumed that players face a social dilemma when-
ever they are prompted to make a decision, such that the one-shot payoff of cooperation is at most the
one-shot payoff of defection. We thus interpret the above result as an indication that for our findings,
the interaction of reciprocity and payoff feedback has been essential: in none of the examples we would
have observed the emergence of cooperation if players updated their strategies based on their one-shot
payoffs only.
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Appendix B: Proofs of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.
1. According to Eqs. (7) and (8), the values of Pk(sj ,a) can only affect the transition matrix when
calculating entries of the form M(s,a)→(sj ,a′). However, as Q(sj |s,a) = 0 for all s∈S, it follows
from Eq. (7) that M(s,a)→(sj ,a′) = 0, no matter what Pk(sj ,a) is.
2. When the transition function Q is state-independent and deterministic, then for any action profile
a there is a state sa such that Q(sj |s,a) = 0 for all states sj 6= sa, for all previous states s ∈ S.
By the first part of the Proposition, the transition matrix M is thus independent of the values of
Pi(sj ,a) for all states sj 6=sa. In particular, if we define P ′i
(
sj ,a
)
:=Pi(sa,a) for all sj , then P ′
is state-independent and neither the transition matrix M nor the players’ payoffs change if Pi is
replaced by P ′i .
Proof of Proposition 2.
For the proof, we make use of the one-shot deviation principle64: to show that there is no profitable
deviation in a group in which everyone uses WSLS, we only need to check all one-shot deviations
(where a mutant plays a different action for one round, and returns to WSLS for all subsequent rounds).
Due to the definition of WSLS, it is useful to distinguish two possible cases, depending on whether or
not all players have chosen the same action in the previous round. In the following, we calculate the
continuation payoffs for each of these cases, assuming that all players apply WSLS .
1. If the present state is si ∈ S and all players have used the same action in the previous round
(or players find themselves in the very first round of the game), then all players cooperate in all
subsequent rounds, and the continuation payoff piisame becomes
piisame = (1− δ)uiC,n−1 + δ
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |n) · ujC,n−1. (51)
2. If players have used different actions, then all players defect in the next round. Hence, after the
next round players find themselves in the case in which everybody has chosen the same action.
The respective continuation payoff piidiff thus becomes
piidiff = (1− δ)uiD,0 + δ
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |0) · pijsame. (52)
If a player instead decides to make a one-shot deviation in one of these two cases, we can calculate her
continuation payoff as follows:
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1. If all players have used the same action in the previous round (or if players find themselves in the
very first round), a one-shot deviation requires the mutant to defect in the next round, and to play
according to WSLS thereafter. The corresponding continuation payoff is
p˜iisame = (1− δ)uiD,n−1 + δ
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |n−1) · pijdiff. (53)
2. Alternatively, if players have used different actions in the previous round, a one-shot deviation
from WSLS requires the mutant to cooperate in the next round. Her continuation payoff becomes
p˜iidiff = (1− δ)uiC,0 + δ
m∑
j=1
Q(sj |1) · pijdiff. (54)
WSLS is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if piisame ≥ p˜iisame and piidiff ≥ p˜iidiff. Plugging the
definitions (51)–(54) into these inequalities and basic algebraic manipulations yield (17).
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Appendix C: Matlab code for the calculation of payoffs
In the following we provide the code that we have used to calculate the players’ payoffs in stochastic
games with n players and two states.
function [pivec,cvec]=calcPay(Str,QVec,r1,r2,c);
% Calculates the payoff and cooperation rates in a stochastic game with
% deterministic transitions, playing a PGG in each state
% Str ... Matrix with n rows, each row contains the strategy of a player
% Strategies have the form (pC,n-1,...pC,0,pD,n-1,...pD,0) where the letter
% refers to the player’s own action and number refers to cooperators among
% co-players.
% QVec = (qn,...,q0) vector that contains the transition
% probabilities qi to go to state 1 in the next round, depending on
% the number of cooperators
% r1,r2 ... multiplication factors of PGG in each state
% c ... cost of cooperation
% PART I -- PREPARING A LIST OF ALL POSSIBLE STATES OF THE MARKOV CHAIN,
% PREPARING A LIST OF ALL POSSIBLE PAYOFFS IN A GIVEN ROUND
% A state has the form (s,a1,...an) where s is the state of the
% stochastic game and a1,...,an are the player’s actions.
% Hence there are 2 (ˆn+1) states.
n=size(Str,1);
PossState=zeros(2 (ˆn+1),n+1); % Matrix where each row corresponds to a possible
state
for i=1:2 (ˆn+1)
PossState(i,:)=sscanf( dec2bin(i-1,n+1), ’%1d’ )’;
end
piRound=zeros(2 (ˆn+1),n); % Matrix where each row gives the payoff of all players
in a given state
for i=1:2 (ˆn+1)
State=PossState(i,:); nrCoop=sum(State(2:end)); Mult=State(1)*r2+(1-State(1))*r1;
for j=1:n
piRound(i,j)=nrCoop*Mult/n-State(j+1)*c;
end
end
% PART II -- CREATING THE TRANSITION MATRIX BETWEEN STATES
M=zeros(2 (ˆn+1),2 (ˆn+1));
ep=0.001; Str=(1-ep)*Str+ep*(1-Str);
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for row=1:2 (ˆn+1);
StOld=PossState(row,:); % PreviousState
nrCoop=sum(StOld(2:end)); EnvNext=QVec(n+1-nrCoop);
for col=1:2 (ˆn+1);
StNew=PossState(col,:); %NextState
if StNew(1)==1-EnvNext;
trpr=1; % TransitionProbability
for i=1:n
iCoopOld=StOld(1+i);
pval=Str(i,2*n-nrCoop-(n-1)*iCoopOld);
iCoopNext=StNew(1+i);
trpr=trpr*(pval*iCoopNext+(1-pval)*(1-iCoopNext));
end
else
trpr=0;
end
M(row,col)=trpr;
end
end
v=null(M’-eye(2 (ˆn+1))); freq=v’/sum(v);
pivec=freq*piRound;
cvec=sum(freq*PossState(:,2:end))/n;
end
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